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I. INTRODUCTION 
The network is emerging as the signature form of organization in the 
Information Age, just as bureaucracy stamped the Industrial Age, 
hierarchy controlled the Agricultural Era, and the small group roamed 
in the Nomadic Era.1  
A. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:  A TIME FOR CHANGE 
1. The “Transformation Age” of the U.S. Army 
 Since the coordinated terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in 2001, the United States 
Army has both quickened and broadened its transformation process with regard to 
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and technology.  Combat operations 
against asymmetric threats and the highly visible military difficulties in stabilizing Iraq 
have only increased the requirement for transformation.  The burgeoning use of the U.S. 
military in stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as those ongoing in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, further demand rapid, modular, agile, and adaptive military forces.  
In the midst of this “transformation age” in the U.S. Army, the current psychological 
operations (PSYOP) leadership should take dramatic steps to ensure the viability of 
support they provide in a rapidly evolving strategic environment.   
2. The Case of a Korean Reunification 
The transformation of psychological operations training and execution must take 
place in the context of ongoing PSYOP in the Middle East.  At the same time, other 
threats outside of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility 
(AOR) must not be overlooked.  The continuously looming menace of the Stalinist 
regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a case in point.  The 
DPRK continues to threaten U.S. interests, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other allies 
within Asia more than fifty years after the partition of the Korean peninsula.  North and 
South Koreans continue talks that suggest a mutual goal of reunification.  Such 
reunification, whether achieved through diplomatic means or as the result of a renewal 
 
1 J. Lipnack and J. Stamps, The Age of the Network:  Organizing Principles for the 21st Century (New 
York:  Oliver Wight Publications, Inc., 1994), 3. 
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and subsequently victorious conclusion of combat operations, may find PSYOP forces 
unprepared and incapable of providing support unless effective systemic changes to 
training and operations are implemented.   
 Therefore, United States Army psychological operations must undergo an 
immediate and dramatic improvement in training and doctrinal development to provide 
effective support to regional combat operations and to prove useful in stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.  Such issues are especially relevant in light of the difficulties 
that PSYOP forces would face in operations following reunification of the Korean 
peninsula.  Despite a long history of U.S. PSYOP efforts during the Korean War, and the 
more than fifty subsequent years of combined2 ROK-U.S. military operations, today’s 
PSYOP forces appear ill-prepared to conduct effective operations on the Korean 
peninsula.   
3. Psychological Warfare:  Prevalent Throughout History 
Almost every work on psychological warfare (PSYWAR), or more 
contemporarily psychological operations (PSYOP), that one encounters tends to reference 
ancient battles, or even the Bible, to illustrate how deception can influence the result of a 
campaign.  To begin this thesis I have avoided such clichés because it is true that 
deception is at the heart of warfare.  The psychological dimensions of battles, tactics, and 
warfare in general are inextricably linked.  The utility of strategies to attack and exploit 
the “psychological” vulnerabilities of armies and their leaders is an important component 
of victory.  However, historically specified units have not been solely assigned deception 
or psychological operations roles.  Traditionally PSYOP sought to incite fear in one’s 
enemy or to deceive and misdirect the enemy’s operations.   Thus, the inception of 
separate psychological operations units to perform these tasks is a twentieth century 
phenomenon within the United States military.  The majority of PSYOP assets belong to 




2 U.S. and ROK Forces in Korea fall under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) headquartered in 
Seoul.  Operations and training events are conducted in a “combined” fashion that incorporates the 
interactions and planning of ROK and U.S. military counterparts to foster seamless mission execution. 
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4. Psychological Operations Defined 
Clearly every action in warfare has a psychological dimension, whether intended 
or unintended.  However, modern U.S. PSYOP units focus solely on influencing 
“emotions, motives, objective reasoning, decision making, or behavior of foreign target 
audiences.”3  Historically, psychological operations conducted by the U.S. Army differed 
notably from the adversarial propaganda techniques practiced by World War II Axis 
powers or Stalinist regimes (the former Soviet Union or North Korea for example).  The 
overarching emphasis of U.S. messages is the utilization of truth to construct an umbrella 
of credibility with their target audiences.  This is a far cry from the information-control 
and persuasion techniques of Nazi Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, 
Joseph Goebbels, who utilized the principle later dubbed the “big lie.”4  Goebbels’ 
technique was “to persuade the masses…to develop and repeat falsehoods – for example, 
‘The German people are a master race; Europe is menaced by the Jewish conspiracy.’”5   
However, for many people psychological operations connotes deceitful 
propaganda used by information-controlling authoritarian regimes.6  Therefore, even the 
term psychological operations carries with it a certain stigma that may cause distrust of 
U.S. forces on the part of an indigenous people.  The doctrinal term psychological 
warfare was renamed psychological operations in January 1962 to recognize that 
messages directed toward unarmed civilian populaces did not truly constitute “warfare.”7  
Therefore, in maintaining continuity within this thesis, I will continue to refer to such 
operations prior to the Vietnam War as psychological warfare (PSYWAR), and those 
 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-53:  Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (5 
September 2003), I-2. 
4 Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Age of Propaganda:  The Everyday Use and Abuse of 
Persuasion (New York:  Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2001), 108, 319. 
5 Ibid., 108. 
6 Such a negative connotation is illustrated in South America, where the term Military Information 
Support Team (MIST) is utilized as a more socially and politically acceptable categorization.  Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Joint Publication 3-53:  Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, VI-5. 
7 Stanley Sandler, “Cease Resistance:  It’s Good For You!”:  A History of U.S. Army Combat 
Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC:  U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical 
Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 261. 
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operations occurring during and after the Vietnam War as psychological operations 
(PSYOP).  However, the two terms are widely considered to be synonymous.   
B. PSYWAR IN KOREA:  1950-1953 
1. The “PSYWAR Syndrome” and the Cold War 
Psychological effect oriented units within the United States Army became 
permanent with the outbreak of the Korean War.8  Despite significant success during 
World War II, PSYWAR units were disbanded in the post-bellum years.  This disbanding 
of units and neglect of the importance of psychological warfare, the “PSYWAR 
syndrome,” would be repeated following subsequent U.S. conflicts.  These PSYWAR 
units were reinvented as the United States military entered the Cold War.  The escalation 
of tensions and outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 required the rapid re-creation and 
deployment of PSYWAR units.  These units were fielded in a hasty, ad hoc manner that 
resulted in the deployment of untrained and inexperienced personnel to the Far East 
Command (FEC).  These units gradually improved in both furthering the study of the 
scientific principles underpinning the development of persuasive messages, and in the 
technological aspects of PSYWAR product generation and dissemination.  Many lessons 
regarding the conduct of psychological warfare learned during World War II were 
forgotten and re-learned during the Korean War, but were later used to improve training, 
technical, and tactical deficiencies in the embryonic organization.   
Following the armistice in 1953, these newly reinvented units were neglected and 
fell into disrepair.9  The “PSYWAR syndrome” was again in effect, but it gradually 
subsided  as  units  were  called  upon,  and  even  expanded,  during  the  Vietnam  War.  
However, this renewed interest in psychological operations waned once again following 
the end of the Vietnam War.  For the ensuing decade, PSYOP forces diminished and 
atrophied.10   
 
8 The Korean War erupted on 25 June 1950 as the North Koreans attacked southward across the 38th 
parallel.  William Stueck, The Korean War:  An International History (New Jersey:  Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 10. 
9 The armistice was signed on 27 July 1953 in Panmunjom.  Max Hastings, The Korean War (New 
York:  Simon & Schuster, 1987), 325. 




2. The Need for Trained Personnel 
In general, the basic PSYWAR principles and means of dissemination saw little 
alteration throughout the post-Cold War period and (with the sole likely exception of the 
internet) have changed relatively little over the last fifty years.  It is clear, however, that 
radio (and now television) waves propagated from host nation radio towers and mobile 
broadcasting facilities, leaflets dropped from fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft or 
balloons, and tactical loudspeaker and face-to-face communications, all still serve as 
primary means through which PSYOP messages are conveyed to respective target 
audiences.  Therefore, one may conclude that, based upon these trends, the only likely 
future PSYOP advances will be predicated upon the incorporation of emerging 
technological innovations in the realms of media production, distribution, and 
dissemination, or perhaps improved military information sharing and data links.  
However, the emphasis on technology ignores the fundamental question of whether the 
message is effective.  The main hindrance to effective psychological operations currently, 
as it was during the Korean War more than fifty years ago, continues to be the lack of 
fully trained personnel who are capable of conveying credible messages to target 
audiences within the confines of the respective nation’s culture and language.  These 
principle areas of expertise will only become more vital as the U.S. involvement in global 
stabilization and reconstruction operations continues and expands in the Information Age, 
and more ominously, in the event of a renewal of combat operations on the Korean 
peninsula. 
C. THE DPRK:  A FORMIDABLE PSYOP CHALLENGE 
 North Korea has remained highly dependent upon a propaganda-centric approach 
to governance that promotes its communist ideologies and legitimizes both the Kim 
regime and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP).  This DPRK reliance on propaganda to 
control the masses began during the reign of Kim Il-sung, which lasted from the Korean 
War until his death in 1994, and continues under his son and successor, Kim Jong-il.  
During the Korean War, psychological warfare campaigns were waged by both sides.  
While U.S. PSYWAR units were rapidly fielded and gradually improved their PSYWAR 
capabilities throughout the war, so, too, did the North Koreans.  During this process, the 
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North Koreans became quite adept at conducting propaganda operations, especially those 
targeted at their own soldiers and populace.  North Korean soldiers were routinely 
indoctrinated prior to battles and these processes eventually became a routine method for 
coalescing support for the Kim regime.   
 The KWP now has more than a half-century of controlling the dissemination of 
regime manufactured “truth” through the Propaganda and Agitation Department.11  Anti-
Americanism is a central theme of North Korean propaganda.  The DPRK 
encouragement of a fear of the United States empowers the Kim regime.  This allows 
North Korea to promote a “military first” policy that diverts approximately 25 percent of 
its gross domestic product (GDP) toward defense spending, despite its still meager 
overall economy.12  This ranks the DPRK as the number one nation in the world for 
percent of its GDP utilized for defense expenditures.13  
 The DPRK continues to be an anachronism, an information-controlling state in 
the Information Age.  However, this does not mean that the North Koreans are merely on 
the defensive in the international information arena.  Both sides agreed to cease the overt 
propaganda activities along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in June 2004.14  However, an 
estimated forty thousand North Korean agents are assumed to be operating in the south.15  
Control of domestic access to the internet maintains the KWP monopoly on information 
north of the border, as are the continued, stringent regulations concerning radio/television 
broadcast receivers.  Meanwhile, as individuals are restricted to their diets of KWP 
censored information, they also receive political indoctrination tailored to their social 
class and age, beginning with children as young as three months old.16  The creation of 
 
11 Strategic Studies Detachment, Basic PSYOP Study:  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Fort 
Bragg, NC:  4th Psychological Operations Group, June 1980), i. 
12 Charles E. Morrison, ed., “Regional Overview,” in Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2004 (Tokyo:  
Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 12. 
13 Vietnam is ranked a distant second at 7.1 percent.  Ibid.    
14 Norimitsu Onishi, “In a DMZ that Bristles Less, the Villagers are at Home,” New York Times, 3 
August 2004, A4. 
15 Anthony Faiola, “South Korea Weighs Allowing Once-Taboo Support for the North; Debate 
Reflects Division Over Détente,” Washington Post, 22 November 2004, A16. 
16 Strategic Studies Detachment, Basic PSYOP Study:  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, IV-6.   
7 
 
                                                
historical “evidence” to demonstrate the credibility of North Korean propaganda themes 
is also inherent to their strategy.17  Guided by such principles, the KWP can promote anti-
Americanism in its younger generations by interjecting such themes into children’s daily 
school lessons and by providing “proof” through state created “evidence” of U.S. designs 
on Korea.  
 Today, the North Korean propaganda machine continues to enjoy the same 
perpetual domestic domination of information that it perfected during the Cold War.  This 
offers a formidable challenge in the campaign of persuasion and influence.  Even without 
a renewal of full-scale combat operations on the Korean peninsula, the pervasion of 
unbridled anti-Americanism throughout North Korean society casts doubts on the 
abilities of U.S. PSYOP to build trust and communicate effectively with North Korean 
target audiences in support of U.S. objectives for stabilization and reconstruction 
operations following a reunification 
D. CONTEMPORARY PSYOP:  A COLD WAR RELIC? 
1. The Post-Cold War Period:  Increased Civil-Military Interaction   
The abrupt and unexpected conclusion of the Cold War has prompted a shift 
toward the postmodern paradigm in military organizations.18  “Although antecedents 
predate the end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe provided the major thrust to move the military toward the postmodern 
model.”19  Postmodern militaries are characterized by trends toward structural and 
cultural “interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres,” reduced differentiation 
between the branches of the armed forces, increased participation in non-traditional 
military missions, and increased internationally mandated missions.20   
 
17 Strategic Studies Detachment, “Military Capabilities Study:  Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) Appendix C:  Psychological Operations” (Fort Bragg, NC:  4th Psychological Operations 
Group,  November 1998). 
18 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold War,” 
in The Postmodern Military:  Armed Forces after the Cold War, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen 





                                                
However, the main focus under the postmodern paradigm for the psychological 
operations planner is the increasing inevitability of interactions between U.S. military 
forces and a multitude of transnational actors such as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).21  Yet these individuals will likely be skeptical of PSYOP messages received via 
blatantly overt, traditional media such as leaflets, posters, loudspeakers, or 
radio/television broadcasts. However, NGOs may be more persuaded by a strategy of 
interpersonal relationships and trust – especially when the persuader is well-versed in the 
customs and language of the indigenous populace and the values and missions of the 
varying transnational actors.   
2. Escaping the “PSYWAR Syndrome?” 
The media-intense 1991 Persian Gulf War brought a large degree of PSYOP 
success into the international spotlight.  This media attention was largely attributable to 
the results of PSYOP efforts against the Iraqi military:  
Of the targeted audience – 300,000-plus Iraqi troops-approximately 98 
percent of them read or were otherwise exposed to the 29 million leaflets 
dropped in the theater.*  Many EPWs [enemy prisoners of war] were 
found clutching leaflets in their hands or hiding them somewhere on their 
uniforms as they raised their arms to surrender.**  An estimated 88 
percent of the Iraqi forces were influenced by the leaflet drops as intended, 
and 77 percent were persuaded to quit the fight through the combination of 
combat-leaflet operations and credible tactical military threats and 
actions.***22         
In the wake of the Cold War and the subsequent overwhelming victory in Operation 
Desert Storm, the United States began a drawdown of its military forces.  This critical 
event, coupled with increased deployments under the ensuing unipolar world order, 
placed pressures on the U.S. military to continue to “do more with less.”  
 
21 Moskos, Williams, and Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold War,” 2.  Charles C. Moskos, “Toward 
a Postmodern Military:  The United States as a Paradigm,” in The Postmodern Military:  Armed Forces 
after the Cold War, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 26. 
22 Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, “PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” in 
Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, 
Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama:  Air University Press, 1996), 353.  The author’s original footnotes are denoted 
as *, **, and *** representing 16, 17, and 18 respectively.  These notes refer to an interview conducted 
with the Commander or the 4th Psychological Operations Group in 1991.   
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Uncharacteristically, PSYOP forces did not relapse into the pitfall of the “PSYWAR 
syndrome” as in the past.  On the contrary, there is a high commitment to PSYOP troops 
in the Global War on Terror, while progress has been made toward increasing the current 
active duty PSYOP force structure.  
3. The “Cold War Mentality” in the Information Age 
Psychological operations today still tend to emphasize long distance 
communications through leafleting, aerial or ground loudspeaker operations, and radio 
broadcasts rather than face-to-face communications requiring interpersonal, cultural, and 
language capability.  This is reflective of the tactical concepts and missions prevalent 
throughout the Industrial Age and the Cold War.  Such tactics relied heavily upon long-
range message dissemination operations that mirrored the conventional military mindset 
of the day.  
Despite intrinsic difficulties that surround measuring the effectiveness of PSYOP, 
their battlefield effects were “incontestable” following the Persian Gulf War.23  Because 
of these seemingly positive results, psychological operations forces changed little during 
subsequent operations in the 1990s.  Similarly, despite the clamoring for proactive 
transformation apparent in the post-9/11 military, PSYOP training and doctrine today 
largely reflects a “Cold War mentality.”  Its most dramatic changes occurred in the 1980s 
under President Reagan, following his declaration of the “informational element of 
national power.”24   
If contemporary PSYOP forces have finally escaped their recurring tendency to 
lapse into post-conflict neglect, then PSYOP finally has the precise moment in time to 
galvanize meaningful and effective systemic force transformation.  To do so, however, 
means shedding the “Cold War mentality” in favor of developing the relevant principles 
of training and operations necessary for supporting increased roles in stabilization and 
reconstruction operations consistent with the theories of the Information Age. 
 
23 Sandler, “Cease Resistance:  It’s Good For You!”:  A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological 
Operations, 361. 
24 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “No More Tactical Information Detachments:  US Military Psychological 
Operations in Transition,” in Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies, eds. Frank L. 
Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama:  Air University Press, 1996), 30, 45. 
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4. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations 
The Bush administration, having recognized the increasing importance of post-
conflict security-building operations, established the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization at the Department of State in the summer of 2004.25  
United States led operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan constitute stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, as could operations that might take place on a reunified Korean 
peninsula.  Such activities are gaining increasing importance and may be undertaken as a 
logical post-combat phase to a military operation or as a separate strategy to prevent 
nations from befalling state failure or from becoming havens for terrorist network cells.   
These operations are underpinned by four “pillars” for post-conflict 
reconstruction which have been defined and articulated by a joint project between the 
Association of the United States Army (AUSA) and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS).26  These four pillars are security, economic and social well-
being, governance and participation, and justice and reconciliation.27  While current U.S. 
Army doctrine includes such post-Cold War definitions as “stability operations”28 or 
“military operations other than war,”29 the underlying elements that are embodied in the 
four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction are not comprehensively addressed.  This 
doctrinal exclusion is mirrored by current U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine as well.30  
However, it is entirely possible that due to the level of interest and involvement 
 
25 United States Department of State, “Establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization 
(S/CRS),” United States Department of State Press Release, 28 September 2004, available from URL:  
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36558.htm; internet; last accessed March 2005.  
26 Robert C. Orr, “The United States as Nation Builder:  Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction,” in Winning the Peace:  An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. 
Robert C. Orr (Washington DC:  Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 11. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07:  Stability Operations and Support 
Operations, February 2003. 
29 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-07:  Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, June 
1995. 
30 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-53:  Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, September 2003.  
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.30:  Psychological Operations, November 
2003.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301:  Psychological Operations Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures, December 2003.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-
05.302:  Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, June 2004. 
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undertaken by AUSA in the joint post-conflict reconstruction project, that incorporation 
of such concepts into Army doctrine is rapidly approaching.31   
5. Increased Requirement for Face-to-Face Interactions 
The emphasis on military participation in stabilization and reconstruction 
operations as a method of pursuing the Global War on Terror has further implications for 
U.S. PSYOP.  Clearly, U.S. operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that the 
future of U.S. military involvement in destroying terrorist cells abroad will continue to 
presuppose unidentifiable enemy “insurgents” operating interspersed within the civilian 
community and in close proximity to military forces.  Just as the physical distances 
between PSYOP communicators and their target audiences have been reduced to 
individual interactions, ironically the dawning of the Information Age has broadly 
expanded global communications capabilities and access to audiences while 
concomitantly reducing cost.  This allows for not only larger U.S. outreach to target 
audiences, but consequently provides cheaper and more accessible outlets for insurgent 
propaganda on an international level as well.  Therefore, it is becoming more important 
than ever that increased focus be placed upon direct interactions with foreign indigenous 
populaces and transnational actors to build trust, credibility, security, and ultimately – 
stability, while also seeking to undermine the global communications capabilities of the 
enemy forces.  However, the significance of face-to-face communications has not been 
overlooked by the PSYOP community and has been doctrinally characterized as “the 
most common and potentially effective mission conducted by TPTs [tactical PSYOP 
teams].”32  Typically, these face-to-face missions take on the role of one-way 
communications via loudspeaker.  What has not been articulated to any great extent is the 
importance of two-way communications during these face-to-face interactions as a means 
for both PSYOP influence and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. 
 
 
31 The foreword in the CSIS/AUSA publication Winning the Peace:  An American Strategy for Post-
Conflict Reconstruction was co-authored by General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan, former U.S. Army 
Chief of Staff and current president of AUSA.   
32 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.302:  Tactical Psychological Operations 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, June 2004, 7-13. 
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6. The Pitfalls of “Cookie Cutter” PSYOP 
The twentieth century’s Cold War military mentality also led U.S. PSYOP into a 
self-styled “cookie-cutter” approach to communications in which certain themes or 
PSYOP products, perceived as effective in the past, were in essence recycled in 
subsequent wars.  Hence, the B-29 leaflets disseminated during World War II were 
modified and reissued as the B-52 leaflets of the Vietnam and later Persian Gulf Wars.33  
While there are certain cases where such themes or products may be effectively recycled 
in later conflicts under similar conditions, the mindset in training psychological 
operations specialists has historically been characterized by an emphasis on generic 
psychological operations concepts as opposed to creating soldiers who are expertly 
trained in specific regional, cultural, or language fields.  This is a dangerous trend to 
continue because not only may such practices contribute to the dissemination of messages 
that are inappropriate for given target audiences but may also result in reduced abilities of 
PSYOP personnel to intelligibly communicate with target audiences in a stabilization and 
reconstruction environment.   
Poorly crafted PSYOP products disseminated at a tactical level are able to be 
elevated to a highly visible strategic setting in rather short order given the access 
available to contemporary media.  At best such gaffs are shrugged off by the target 
audience while the central meaning is understood, at worst the message’s meaning can 
de-legitimize the source of the message, undermine U.S. credibility, or spark undesirable 
or even mission-threatening actions on the part of the message recipients.  Such mistakes 
may often be the result of non-systemic oversights on the part of the message crafters; 
however, more systemically they may be indicative of a heavy reliance upon generic 
psychological operations principles, “cookie-cutter” solutions, and too little emphasis on 
regional, language, cultural, or persuasion theory training.  I argue that these are precisely 
the skills that need to be cultivated within our contemporary PSYOP forces for success 
 
33 These leaflets typically depict the aircraft releasing its bombs while warning individuals that a 
bombing will take place at a specified date and time.  The bombing then occurs as promised and the result 
is that the credibility of the PSYOP messages is validated and subsequent messages are taken more 
seriously by target audiences.  The World War II B-29 leaflet and the Vietnam War/Persian Gulf War  B-52 
leaflets can be found in:  Sandler, “Cease Resistance:  It’s Good For You!”:  A History of U.S. Army 
Combat Psychological Operations, 192-193, 283-284, 341-342. 
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under the postmodern military paradigm and the vehicle for viable influence operations 
must emphasize the use of the network – the cornerstone of operations in the Information 
Age.   
7. The Importance of Networks 
 In an age when participation in stabilization and reconstruction operations are on 
the rise, it is important to highlight the importance of “hearts and minds” campaigns that 
strive to improve U.S. credibility and legitimacy while simultaneously attempting to 
deprive insurgent networks of future operatives.  While PSYOP forces are not the sole 
bearers of responsibility in a hearts and minds campaign, they do play a significant role.  
Clearly U.S. policy decisions are key influencers in shaping world opinion and therefore 
military PSYOP is but one small element to an overarching persuasion strategy.   
Crucial to these hearts and minds strategies is the building of trust between U.S. 
forces, the local population, and transnational actors, along with the methodical targeting 
of the post-conflict reconstruction pillars.  Both PSYOP and civil affairs units operate in 
a face-to-face manner with citizens in order to facilitate increased credibility, foster 
stability, and build trust.  Paramount to the concept of networks, however, is that trust-
building leads to the amassing of social capital.34   
Trust is the basis of a new source of wealth in the Information Age, one 
based on connections.  As trust accumulates, people build up ‘social 
capital...35   
Through this accumulation of social capital, predicated upon the building of trust, 
networks are constructed.36  The importance of recognizing these principles of networks 
is elevated with the understanding that terrorist networks are advanced and highly adept 
at both obtaining economic and logistical support for their operations and recruiting 
additional personnel.   
For PSYOP and civil affairs forces to capitalize on the building of networks 
requires the ability to communicate effectively with the indigenous population.  Regional 
 
34 Lipnack and Stamps, The Age of the Network:  Organizing Principles for the 21st Century, 177. 
35 Ibid., 24. 
36 Ibid., 197. 
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and language expertise are essential tools to facilitate trust-building, social capital 
accumulation, and consequently – network construction.  However, the predominant form 
of face-to-face PSYOP communications involves playing a recording, via loudspeaker, 
tailored to a specific language, passing out handbills, or doling out humanitarian aid.  
While these soldiers may have language “familiarity,” they are widely incapable of 
maintaining simple conversations with the indigenous populace.  Furthermore, translators 
or interpreters have frequently been in short supply.  This leaves the PSYOP personnel 
relatively oblivious to the true underlying dynamics of a particular village or region 
despite “face-to-face” interactions.   
8. A Training Disconnect? 
 With the increased usage of PSYOP forces in environments that stress one-on-one 
interactions with indigenous populaces and transnational actors, it is necessary that the 
PSYOP training programs provide the skills necessary for communicating and persuading 
in such environs.  Such skills should entail sufficient study of the language and culture 
necessary to produce soldiers who can communicate with efficacy while also 
understanding key principles of persuasion.  Unfortunately, the current PSYOP training 
programs, for both officers and enlisted soldiers, are predicated upon theoretical 
disconnects that do not provide the tools necessary for coherent, well-planned 
psychological operations activities via Cold War styled delivery systems; let alone for 
operations that rely upon two-way, face-to-face communications.  The importance of 
rectifying these training disconnects is underscored by the fact that civil affairs officers 
undergo the same training as PSYOP officers and are therefore similarly constrained in 
operational performance by the inadequacies of the training program.   
a. PSYOP Enlisted Soldiers (37F) 
  Today’s PSYOP enlisted soldiers, assigned to military occupational 
specialty (MOS) 37F (Psychological Operations Specialist), attend the twelve week 37F 
Advanced Individual Training (AIT) course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.37  This 
 
37 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Advanced Individual Training 
Psychological Operations (37F) Info Papers,” and “Advanced Individual Training Psychological 
Operations (37F) Specialist Scope,” available from URL:  http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm; 
internet; last accessed March 2005. 
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program is primarily for soldiers who have recently completed Basic Training and are 
now being trained in their job specialty.  The 37F AIT course consists of both basic 
soldier and PSYOP specialist elements, however, these soldiers are provided with no 
regional training whatsoever.38  Meanwhile, these soldiers serve as the primary crafters of 
PSYOP messages, analyzers of varying target audiences, and developers of PSYOP 
products.  These soldiers typically attend a Basic Military Language Course (BMLC), 
also located at Fort Bragg, which provides language familiarity but little substantive 
language capability.  The current BMLC language proficiency goals for its graduates 
increased in 2004.39  Therefore, where soldiers were previously required to achieve a 
level in listening skills in which they comprehend “with reasonable accuracy only when 
this [listening] involves short memorized utterances or formulae;”40 they are currently 
required to achieve a slightly higher level in which they can understand “very simple 
face-to-face conversations in a standard dialect.”41  Similarly, pre-2004 standards called 
for a level of reading capability in which the graduates are “unable to read connected 
prose,”42 versus the current standard that requires one to be capable of reading “very 
simple connected written material.”43  Previous graduation evaluation criteria, and indeed 
Department of the Army language tracking, only focused on these aforementioned 
listening and reading skills.  However, these parameters have recently been expanded to 
include an emphasis on speaking skills as well.44  Therefore, current graduates of BMLC 
are now required to reach a level in speaking capability in which the speaker is “unable to 
 
38 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Advanced Individual Training 
Psychological Operations (37F) Info Papers,” and “Advanced Individual Training Psychological 
Operations (37F) Specialist Scope,” available from URL:  http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm; 
internet; last accessed March 2005. 
39 “SF Officers, NCOs Must Meet New DLPT Minimum,” Special Warfare 17, no. 1 (September 
2004):  63. 
40 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 611-6:  Army Linguist Management 
(Washington DC:  February 1996), 37. 
41 Ibid., 38. 
42 Ibid., 39. 
43 Ibid. 
44 “SF Officers, NCOs Must Meet New DLPT Minimum,” 63. 
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produce continuous discourse except with rehearsed material.”45  Active duty civil affairs 
enlisted soldiers are primarily drawn from the special forces branch and typically receive 
the same language training (BMLC) as the PSYOP enlisted soldiers. 
  Other enlisted soldiers who are more proficient in language capabilities 
are organic to PSYOP units.  These soldiers are identified as MOS 97E (Human 
Intelligence Collector) and are organized under the Army’s military intelligence branch.  
Language training for these soldiers is conducted at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) 
in Monterey, California, where they are trained for greater lengths and subsequently to 
higher standards than graduates of BMLC.46  Additionally, the soldiers assigned the MOS 
of 97E are classified as having “language-dependent” specialties and must retain the 
same DLI minimum levels in language proficiency or risk losing their military 
occupational specialty qualification (MOSQ).47  This would require such individuals to 
be reclassified into another, and sometimes much less appealing, MOS.  Psychological 
operations specialists (37F) are classified by current Army regulations as a “non-
language-dependent MOS,” and therefore do not have the same language requirement as 
part of their MOSQ.  Therefore, languages obtained are not required to be retained by the 
soldier.48  This is a drain on both budgets and resources.   
b. PSYOP Officers 
  Psychological operations officers receive training at a four week 
Psychological Operations Officer Course (POOC), a seventeen week Regional Studies 
Course (RSC), and BMLC.49  Therefore, PSYOP officers, who do not share the enlisted 
soldiers’ focus on message crafting, audience selection, or appropriateness, receive 
 
45 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 611-6:  Army Linguist Management, 36. 
46 Basic language courses taught at the Defense Language Institute are designed to train individuals to 
level defined as “limited working proficiency.”  When applied to speaking skills, this level of proficiency 
enables one to “satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements.”  Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, Army Regulation 611-6:  Army Linguist Management, 4, 36. 
47 Ibid., 7. 
48 Ibid. 
49 The only difference between this training program and the one prescribed for civil affairs officers is 
the inclusion of the Civil Affairs Officer Course (CAOC) in lieu of the PSYOP Officer Course.  
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3:  Commissioned Officer 
Development and Career Management (Washington DC:  October 1998), 166-172.  
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formal regional training to increase their knowledge of a particular area of the world.  
Some officers are further offered the opportunity to attend Advanced Civil Schooling 
(ACS) to study under master’s degree programs.  Typically these officers are sent to the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School under the auspices of the Special Operations Low-
Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) program (as are the civil affairs officers).50  While this 
program has applicability due to psychological operations constituting one arm of the 
Army’s special operations, “PSYOP support to special operations” is but one out of many 
activities undertaken by PSYOP forces across the range of military operations.51  As 
Colonel (retired) Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. stated, “In general, the current subordination of 
PSYOP elements to special operations detracts from recognition of the overall 
applicability of psychological operations in times of peace, crisis, and war.”52  Relevant 
degrees in regional studies, marketing, and persuasion and social influence, the 
underpinnings of PSYOP, are not pursued.  Furthermore, the PSYOP community does 
little to provide a professional outlet for information and operational and academic 
discourse.  While the quarterly periodical Special Warfare is one publication that 
currently receives PSYOP oriented articles, it is predominantly an outlet for special 
forces discourse and is frequently little more than a newsletter for the special forces, civil 
affairs, and PSYOP branch and Special Warfare School administrative notes along with 
some feedback from recent military exercises.53  Identical to the PSYOP enlisted soldier 
language requirements, PSYOP officers are not required to maintain their language 
capabilities.54  
 
50 This program yields a Master of Science (MS) Degree in Defense Analysis with a specialization in 
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.  United States Naval Postgraduate School, “Department of 
Defense Analysis Special Operations Curriculum,” available from URL:  http://www.nps.navy.mil/da/; 
internet; last accessed March 2005. 
51 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-53:  Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, VI-2, 
VI-8. 
52 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “Military Psychological Operations,” in Political Warfare and 
Psychological Operations:  Rethinking the U.S. Approach, eds. Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord 
(Washington DC:  National Defense University Press, 1989), 58. 
53 Special Warfare is published quarterly by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.   
54 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3:  Commissioned 
Officer Development and Career Management, 167. 
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9. The Difficulty of Korea 
 Not only are the challenges of influencing the population of North Korea 
formidable, but the prospects of effectively persuading South Koreans through PSYOP 
are increasingly appearing less plausible with the rise of anti-American sentiments among 
the post-Korean War generations.55  Little is being done by U.S. PSYOP to combat this 
anti-Americanism.  There are no U.S. PSYOP forces stationed on the Korean peninsula to 
provide active PSYOP support to the Combined Forces Command (CFC).  Predominantly 
U.S. PSYOP forces deploy to the ROK for military exercises and then redeploy to the 
continental United States (CONUS) where they are based.  Such deployments occur 
multiple times throughout the year and are characterized by a great degree of 
impermanence in the relationships between the U.S. and ROK PSYOP personnel.  These 
difficulties are compounded by the inability of most U.S. PSYOP personnel to read or 
speak Korean to the degree necessary to communicate.  Likewise, this phenomenon is 
mirrored by the ROK personnel’s inability to communicate in English.  Communications 
within the Combined Psychological Operations Task Force (CPOTF) rely heavily upon a 
minimal amount of personnel who can communicate in these two languages.  Such an 
obvious constraint begs the question of whether U.S. PSYOP personnel who cannot 
communicate with their ROK counterparts can effectively craft messages to persuade 
target audiences within the ROK, let alone in the communist north.   Such difficulties in 
communication are only exacerbated when the setting for the message dissemination is 
changed from a Cold War styled leaflet drop to a close-quarters interaction such as those 
required in stabilization and reconstruction operations.  Furthermore, more than a half-
century of partition has exacerbated the initial bifurcation of the once homogenous 
Korean culture.  Thus, not only must PSYOP soldiers understand “ROK Korean” 
language and culture, but they must also be able to distinguish and operate utilizing 
“DPRK Korean” language and culture, as well as the regional dialects within each 
category.   
 
 
55 Seung-Hwan Kim, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 1 (Winter 
2002-2003):  113. 
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10. PSYOP Transformation Prescriptions 
 The transformational recommendations proposed as prescriptive measures to 
improve PSYOP contributions in the event of reunification of the Korean peninsula are 
generally systemic in nature.  In this regard they largely have implications for improved 
execution of psychological operations throughout all AORs and especially when 
operating under the umbrella of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations.  
While these recommendations are not a panacea for improving PSYOP influence 
capabilities, they do constitute a basis for improving the expertise of PSYOP personnel in 
several critical areas while focusing on the evolving missions of the U.S. Army.   
 No matter the medium that is utilized to deliver a PSYOP message to its intended 
target audience, the most critical part of a PSYOP product development system is the 
proper training of the personnel.  In an age of increased civil-military interactions during 
operational deployments, the “product” takes on the form of effective communications 
articulated through human interactions.  This is also critical to obtaining vital HUMINT 
that can then subsequently be input back into the overall PSYOP campaign planning and 
execution process.  However, such activities are predicated first upon the linguistic and 
cultural capabilities of the soldiers employed under such scenarios.  Such interactions are 
impossible to the same degree with an individual’s broadcast of a PSYOP message via 
compact disc and an overt loudspeaker.  Such actions serve more as the modus operandi 
of “warrior deejays” than of “warrior diplomats.”  Therefore, PSYOP training must get 
“back to the basics:”   
• Language training must be conducted to the DLI level of proficiency to 
provide greater capabilities to all PSYOP soldiers (officer and enlisted).    
• Maintenance of language capabilities to DLI standards must be made a 
requirement for MOSQ of all officer and enlisted soldiers. 
• Officers from across the Army possessing skills vital to PSYOP, 
especially in critical languages, should be actively recruited by PSYOP 
utilizing bonuses and other incentives. 
• PSYOP enlisted soldiers must receive regional and cultural training. 
• PSYOP officers should pursue master’s degrees in those disciplines that 
form the underpinnings of PSYOP such as regional studies, persuasion 
and social influence, and marketing. 
20 
 
                                                
• The 4th Psychological Operations Group should publish its own 
professional journal of military PSYOP, encourage discourse, and invite 
both the reserve component groups and other services to contribute. 
Furthermore, the trends of the postmodern military provide the impetus for additional 
changes to escape the “Cold War mentality:” 
• Corresponding to current trends in military operations, the principles that 
underpin stabilization and reconstruction operations, most notably the 
“four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction,” should be closely scrutinized 
for doctrinal advancements in PSYOP support.56   
• Trained PSYOP personnel should be utilized to establish Psychological 
Operations Networks (PONs) as a means of persuading target audiences at 
a grass-roots level.  Such networks utilize the building of social capital via 
interpersonal interactions utilizing two-way, face-to-face communications 
in the target language while allowing the mapping of the varied nodes in 
the network.  Messages that are delivered are adaptive and persuasive in 
pursuing PSYOP objectives.  This enables PSYOP to improve its 
persuasiveness in supporting U.S. objectives while gathering critical 
HUMINT, identifying insurgents or potential insurgents, facilitating the 
facets of stabilization and reconstruction operations, and ultimately 
winning more “hearts and minds” than previously possible.  
Finally, the conduct of psychological operations in North Korea, South Korea, or 
possibly in a newly reunified Korean state poses formidable challenges that must be 
anticipated and mitigated before an emergency arises: 
• It is imperative that the training and deployment of a PSYOP detachment 
to the Korean peninsula be expedited.  This unit should be fully trained in 
the Korean language and culture, with special care given to determining 
the divergent points along these lines with regard to the two distinctly 
separate nations.   
• The conduct of active combined psychological operations, focused on both 
ROK and DPRK target audiences, must be instituted immediately.  These 
units should focus on counterpropaganda operations with designs to dilute 




56 This should be done through interaction with the newly established Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.  Information on this center can be 




                                                
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND THESIS METHODOLOGY 
1. Critical Assumptions 
 This thesis is predicated on three primary assumptions.57  First, any agreements 
bringing about a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula would not proscribe U.S. 
Army PSYOP force involvement, even if only for humanitarian assistance operations.  
Second, a renewal of combat operations on the Korean peninsula would likewise entail 
U.S. Army PSYOP force participation.  Finally, the current U.S. Army PSYOP 
leadership understands the need for increases in PSYOP force structure and is actively 
pursuing this issue.  Currently, increases to active duty PSYOP forces are to take place 
over the next few years.58   
2. Thesis Methodology 
 Chapter II of this thesis will analyze the U.S. psychological warfare efforts during 
the Korean War to present the initial baptism by fire that PSYWAR forces underwent 
after their hasty reorganization and to provide the predominant lessons learned during this 
conflict as a backdrop for highlighting contemporary PSYOP transformation 
requirements.  Chapter III of this thesis will discuss the formidability posed by DPRK 
propaganda with an emphasis on its domestic usage.  This will further accentuate the 
difficulties that psychological operations would face in persuading North Korean target 
audiences, who have historically been heavily indoctrinated with anti-Americanism.  
Chapter IV will discuss contemporary psychological operations training and execution to 
stress deficiencies in the current methodologies and the impetus for change.  I will further 
present transformative PSYOP prescriptions that seek to prepare PSYOP forces for future  
 
57 In the event that any or all of these assumptions may possibly prove untenable, the conclusions of 
this thesis will not be invalidated due to their further reaching applicability.   For example, while a unified 
Korean state could emerge that is unreceptive toward U.S. support; such a scenario does not warrant the 
abandonment of military psychological operations preparedness in Korea or in other regions of the world.   
58 Congress, House, Armed Forces Subcommittee on Unconventional Threats, Testimony to the House 
Armed Services Subcommittee on Unconventional Threats by Mr. Marshall Billingslea, Principal Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations / Low-Intensity 
Conflict, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 1 April 2003, 12. 
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II. PSYWAR IN KOREA:  1950-1953 
On 25 June 1950, there were no readiness measures in terms of 
operating personnel or equipment for psywar on hand in the Far East 
Theatre; there were only plans.59
A. “REINVENTING THE WHEEL” 
1. The “PSYWAR Syndrome:” Degenerative Post-War Tendencies 
Despite the prevalence of psychological warfare in both World War I and World 
War II, such units no longer existed in the U.S. Army inventory at the outbreak of the 
Korean War.60  The importance of psychological warfare largely fell by the wayside and 
by the time the Korean War ignited in the summer of 1950, the U.S. Army was forced 
hastily to re-create and deploy PSYWAR units to fulfill the burgeoning needs in the Far 
East.  Thus, the post-bellum dismantling of the U.S. PSYWAR apparatuses and de-
emphasis on PSYWAR principles in general, the “PSYWAR syndrome,” largely resulted 
in the delayed employment of untrained soldiers during the Korean War.  These forces 
were mostly innocent of previously ascertained PSYWAR principles due to the depletion 
of critical institutional knowledge during the interim years of peace that occupied the late 
1940s.  Soldiers who possessed PSYWAR experience from World War II were not a part 
of the newly reinstituted units and the rapidity with which these forces were fielded did 
not allow for adequate training to occur prior to their deployment to East Asia.  This 
greatly impeded PSYWAR progress in attaining a level in capability that was even 
commensurate with the PSYWAR units of World War II.61   
Due to the aforementioned elimination of PSYWAR forces from the Army, many 
psychological warfare lessons of World War II were forgotten and inevitably re-learned 
during the Korean War.  Similarly, this devolution into the “PSYWAR syndrome” 
 
59 George S. Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War (Chevy Chase, Maryland:  Operations 
Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 5. 
60 Ibid., 29. 
61 One statement indicates that it took two full years for PSYWAR operations in the Korean War to 
attain such a level.  Carl Berger, An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets (Special Operations Research Office, 
The American University, 1959), xi. 
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occurred again following the Korean War and hindered initial psychological operations 
efforts during the Vietnam War.62  However, because Korean War era units were not 
disbanded, in stark contrast to the World War II PSYWAR units, many of the 
psychological warfare lessons that emanated from the Korean War were beneficial to 
honing psychological warfare doctrine, execution, and improved equipment.  
Nevertheless, the main underlying factor that hindered psychological warfare during the 
Korean War -- comprehensive training -- was inadequately addressed before the end of 
the war.   
2. A Need for PSYWAR 
Among the myriad of difficulties faced in reviving PSYWAR units were how to 
devise the techniques to employ viable psychological warfare operations against the 
North Koreans.  The communist North Koreans (later accompanied by communist 
Chinese in November 1950)63 stressed the widespread use of both propaganda and 
agitation.64  The North Koreans relentlessly directed their propaganda activities at both 
their indigenous population and military forces, and to a lesser degree against their 
enemies.65  Furthermore, due partially to the PSYWAR ability to affect the strategic level 
of operations in particular, a Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was constituted under 
the auspices of the Truman administration to provide national policy for psychological 
warfare.66  Thus, the U.S. military had a large stake in providing forces capable of 
combating enemy propaganda operations while simultaneously supporting U.S. national 
objectives.  However, providing capable forces proved extremely problematical because 
PSYWAR units had to be wholly reconstructed.   
 
62 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “No More Tactical Information Detachments:  US Military Psychological 
Operations in Transition,” in Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies, eds. Frank L. 
Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama:  Air University Press, 1996), 28. 
63 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 14. 
64 Agitation utilizes “individuals, including party members, for active work as promoters, organizers, 
talkers, in a grass-roots approach to the popular audience.”  Ibid., 4. 
65 See Chapter III for more about North Korean utilization of propaganda during and after the Korean 
War. 
66 Stephen E. Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg:  Stackpole 
Books, 1992), 16. 
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3. Execution of Wartime Psychological Warfare Operations 
While war plans that included psychological warfare particulars existed, and some 
missions were executed only days after the outbreak of the Korean War, PSYWAR forces 
continually lagged in their contributions to the overall war effort.67  Units were slowly 
fielded and deployed to the Far East, and even after they had arrived still did not possess 
all of the requisite personnel or equipment to execute missions.  Despite these initial 
setbacks, various personnel were scrounged within the theater, especially those 
possessing language capabilities, for bolstering PSYWAR operations.  However, even as 
the PSYWAR units grew in personnel strength, operations were far from fluid.  This was 
due to largely inadequately trained and inexperienced personnel.  Despite great strides 
that were made during the Korean War to further PSYWAR capabilities, the training of 
PSYWAR personnel was constantly denoted as a critical issue for soldiers operating at 
both strategic and tactical levels.68   
4. PSYWAR Lessons from Korea  
By the time the Korean War erupted, most of the methods utilized for 
disseminating PSWAR messages were established during the two World Wars.  Leaflets 
were disseminated through both leaflet bombs and leaflet artillery rounds (LARs).69  The 
use of loudspeakers and radio broadcasts had been widely used during World War II.70  
Thus, the major psychological warfare advances resulting from the Korean War were the 
compilation of a variety of PSYWAR “lessons learned.”71  Recommendations by newly 
experienced officers and staffs, and those facts gathered through interrogations of enemy 
prisoners of war (EPWs) also greatly contributed to the enhancement of psychological 
 
67 Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953, 15.   
68 Most references to PSYWAR at this point in history tend to categorize operations into the strategic 
or tactical level while largely ignoring the operational level of warfare.   
69 Even the leaflet artillery round utilized in World War I was forgotten until 1943.  Berger, An 
Introduction to Wartime Leaflets, xi. 
70 Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953, 5. 
71 Many significant contributions were made by studies conducted by the Operations Research Office 
(ORO) under contract to the U.S. Army through Johns Hopkins University.  However, this contract was not 
maintained because the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare staff believed the studies to be “too 
general.”  Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare:  Its Origins (Kansas:  University Press of 
Kansas, 2002), 118. 
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warfare capabilities.  While some of these lessons were technological in nature, many of 
them highlight the difficulties of crafting appropriate messages without the essential 
training in PSYWAR, foreign language, or regional studies.   
5. Chapter Methodology 
This study will begin by discussing the situational reality of PSYWAR during the 
Korean War by dividing it into two time periods.  The first covers the outbreak of war in 
June 1950 and encompasses approximately the next six months.  This will highlight the 
levels of initial PSYWAR planning, preparedness, and operational difficulties that 
characterized the initial months of combat until shortly after the Chinese intervention.  
Next, it will discuss the execution of U.S. PSYWAR activities during the remainder of 
the Korean War as operations became more focused, its effectiveness against enemy 
troops, and its difficulties in persuading targeted audiences.  This will demonstrate how 
the conduct of PSYWAR had evolved during the subsequent years of combat.  I will then 
draw from these two time periods to provide the major overarching systemic lessons 
learned from psychological warfare during the Korean War and to discuss the absolute 
criticality of focusing on the principles that underpin the conduct of psychological 
warfare.   
B. PSYWAR AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR 
The importance of PSYWAR that had been apparent during the latter stages of 
World War II was lost during the brief interwar period.  By the beginning of the Korean 
War on 25 June 1950, the Tactical Information Detachment of Aggressor Force at Fort 
Riley, Kansas was the only PSYWAR unit that remained in the entire United States 
Army that dealt with PSYWAR.72  Comprised of approximately twenty personnel, it 
focused mainly on simulating loudspeaker and leaflet operations against U.S. troops 
during training exercises.73  Worse, in 1950, there was only one PSYWAR trained soldier 
 
72 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 29. 
73 Stanley Sandler, “Cease Resistance:  It’s Good For You!”:  A History of U.S. Army Combat 
Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC:  U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical 
Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 20. 
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within the entire Far East Theater.74  Despite the absence of PSYWAR units, however, 
PSYWAR plans were still incorporated into the theater-level war plans.75  These plans 
were created by a seven-member planning cell that was established under the auspices of 
the Special Projects Branch of Civil Intelligence, G-2, General Headquarters (GHQ), and 
had been in existence since 1949.76  As further proof of the decline of emphasis on 
PSYWAR, instruction in psychological warfare studies at the Army’s professional 
military schools had also completely ceased to exist.77  
Despite these seemingly insurmountable challenges, remarkably the first leaflets 
disseminated by U.S. forces during the Korean War came less than twenty-four hours 
after President Truman authorized military intervention against the north, and the first 
broadcasts from Radio Japan began less than twenty-four hours after that.78  Both of these 
efforts, however, were conducted by the small staff in the Far East Theater and were in 
no way indicative of an actual capability to sustain a PSYWAR campaign.79  The 
establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board in 1950 at the U.S. national level soon 
led the U.S. Army to establish its own central PSYWAR coordinating authority on 15 
January 1951, which was named the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare 
(OCPW).80  However, only in April 1952, almost two years into the war, did the Army 
finally establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.81   
The war created a large demand for expeditiously filling newly established 
PSYWAR units with personnel ready to deploy and execute combat operations.  These 
units “were hastily manned by reserve officers with backgrounds in journalism, 
 
74 This was a former military police lieutenant colonel.  Herbert Avedon, A Study of Psychological 
Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign– A Study (AFFE PSYWAR, 10 August 1953), 56. 
75 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 5, 13. 
76 Ibid., 13. 
77 Sandler, “Cease Resistance:  It’s Good For You!”:  A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological 
Operations, 205. 
78 Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953, 15.   
79 The radio broadcast was only thirty minutes in duration and was broadcast twice on 29 June 1950.  
Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 27. 
80 Ibid., 16. 
81 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare:  Its Origins, 140. 
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newspaper printing, novel and script writing, art, and radio technology.”82  In spite of all 
of the markedly applicable aspects of these civilian occupations, these soldiers lacked 
adequate training in the core fundamentals for psychological warfare operations in Korea:  
general PSYWAR principles and Korean/Chinese culture, language, and customs.  Also 
noticeably lacking was leadership experienced in the conduct of PSYWAR during World 
War II.  Because there was no time properly to train these units, these soldiers deployed 
without the necessary expertise to execute their missions effectively.  As the number of 
personnel in the Far East PSYWAR planning cell grew, it experienced tremendous 
difficulties.  The military was scoured to acquire the critical personnel, such as 
translators.  However, reliance on these ad hoc procedures was vital to accomplishing 
missions.   
1. Radio Broadcast Operations 
The VUNC (Voice of the United Nations Command) began broadcasting from 
Tokyo on 29 June 1950.83  Translators to conduct these strategic operations were 
gathered from various locales including the Korean Embassy, the Bank of Korea (Tokyo 
Branch), and the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service.84  This unit was capable of 
broadcasting only three hours of material each day at this stage of the war.85  The 
preparation of ninety minutes of programming took approximately forty-eight man-hours 
to prepare in Korean or Chinese.86  This was extremely manpower intensive and was a 
direct result of the lack of personnel possessing PSYWAR, language, or cultural 
knowledge.   
By January 1951, George Pettee, an analyst with the Operations Research Office 
(ORO), had noted that, “The radio effort of the US psywar program up to the present has 
been very small compared to the enemy-controlled radio propaganda effort addressed to 
 
82 Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953, 24. 
83 Ibid., 95. 
84 Ibid., 96. 




                                                
the Far East.”87  The communists were clearly determined to control the airwaves.  The 
purpose of their broadcasts was not simply to influence the enemy, but more importantly, 
to continue the propagation of its indoctrinating principles upon their own military forces 
and civilians.88  Much was done to utilize existing radio stations in broadcasts to the 
North Korean populace and communist militaries.  For example, when the UN forces 
held Pyongyang early in the war, PSYWAR forces sent a contingent of personnel there to 
reestablish Radio Pyongyang.89  By the middle of the next month, the station was under 
UN operation and was transmitting programming up to six hours a day.90  Obviously, this 
control was relinquished during later combat as Pyongyang passed between United States 
and communist control.91   
2. Leaflet Operations 
Also by that time, the United States forces had disseminated over 160 million 
leaflets which targeted only four different target audiences.92  During the first five 
months, the thematic emphasis was on distributing safe conduct passes and surrender 
appeals.93  In December 1950, themes began to shift toward undermining enemy morale.  
Feedback on disseminated PSYWAR products and their battlefield effects was 
complicated by the fact that there was not, as of yet, agreement among the multiple 
producers of leaflets on how to classify them.94  Also, by January 1951, the United States 
began to analyze the results from over six months of EPW interrogations to determine 
systemic evidence of the effects of PSYWAR products on the enemy.  However, they still 
 
87 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 5. 
88 See Chapter III for about North Korean utilization of propaganda during and after the Korean War. 
89 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 28. 
90 Ibid. 
91 This occurred in December 1950 in the wake of the Chinese intervention.  William Stueck, The 
Korean War:  An International History (New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1995), 128. 
92 These audiences were enemy soldiers/civilians and ROK soldiers/civilians.  Pettee, US PSYWAR 
Operations in the Korean War, 16.   
93 Ibid., 17. 
94 Therefore, depending on the analyst, one leaflet could feasibly be categorized as a surrender theme 
or instead as a good conduct theme.  According to Pettee, “Some leaflets are always on the borderline 
between any categories that are set up.”  Ibid.     
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had not conducted key research on enemy target audiences and demographics.95  Thus, 
their inability to isolate specific target audiences forced message themes to be broad in 
nature in order to ensure as much applicability as possible. 
3. Tactical (Micro) PSYWAR 
In the conduct of tactical PSYWAR (or micro-PSYWAR as the ORO referred to 
it at the time), the United States was underdeveloped.  During the first several months of 
the war, tactical level loudspeaker operations were only being conducted on an 
experimental basis.96  It was noted that, “Although widely and effectively used by many 
forces on both sides in World War II, there has been little equipment available in Korea, 
and what has been available has been used with little effect, because of failure to provide 
adequate personnel for its operation and adequate organizational arrangements for its 
proper use.”97 Only two vehicle-mounted loudspeakers and two aerial-mounted 
loudspeakers were conducting operations by January 1951.98  The two aerial mounted 
loudspeakers were operated on C-47 planes and had only been made available in the 
October-November 1950 timeframe.99  Not until early 1951 did the Army conduct 
appropriate aerial loudspeaker tests to determine exactly how audible such broadcasts 
were from different altitudes.  The results indicated that at altitudes of over fifteen-
hundred feet the messages were unintelligible.100  Unfortunately, however, these 
loudspeaker equipped aircraft had already been operating for months at high altitudes.101  
Loudspeaker operations overall were hampered by the theater-wide lack of equipment, 
training, properly structured PSYWAR forces, and language qualified personnel.102   
As the war progressed, PSYWAR personnel gradually gained experience.  
Despite their progress, the need for adequate training was still evident in their comments.  
 
95 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 6. 
96 Ibid., 7. 
97 Ibid., 23. 
98 Ibid., 2. 
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100 Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953, 112. 
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They acknowledged that they still lacked the cultural and language skills necessary to 
produce effective PSYWAR products.  Therefore, they were forced to rely blindly on 
translators to compensate for these shortcomings.  Such trends would continue for the 
duration of the war. 
George Pettee summarized the PSYWAR problems of the first six months of the 
war in stating: 
…improvisation for psywar in Korea has been compulsory.  The method 
of procurement of personnel has been improvised, the development of 
tactical psywar in the combat zone has been provisional and the devices 
used for getting the message to the audience also have been provisional.103
C. IMPROVING PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:  1951-1953 
1. First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) 
The Tactical Information Detachment from Kansas finally arrived in the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) in November 1950, and provided the core for the formation of the 1st 
Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) which focused on tactical (or micro) 
PSYWAR.104  By January 1951, it was still not in operation.105  It was comprised of 
headquarters, propaganda, publications, and loudspeaker platoons and was under the 
operational control of the G-2 (Intelligence) Section of Eighth U.S. Army Korea 
(EUSAK).106  
The 1st L&L had difficulties in beginning its operations.  Pettee noted that “The 
FLLC [1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company] is the only organization that can be 
mentioned in the history of psywar in Korea that might have provided, had it been fully 
active,  a  good  volume  of  psywar  activity  directed  at  specific  targets  in  combat.”107   
 
103 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 15. 
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Pearce, 1954), 303. 
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Psychological Warfare, 303. 
107 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 29. 
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Following its arrival in Korea, the 1st L&L still had no provision for language or 
PSYWAR qualified personnel to assist in message development and some of their 
equipment had remained in Japan.108   
On 30 November it was learned that much of the equipment was still in 
Yokohama.  Two speakers had arrived in Korea, one of which was 
operable.  One press had arrived, but parts were lacking.109
2. First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) 
In April 1951, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) was 
constituted at Fort Riley and its focus was primarily on the strategic level of 
operations.110  It was comprised of a headquarters, reproduction, and mobile radio 
companies.111  Immediately upon arrival in theater in August 1951112 it took over the 
conduct of strategic broadcasts from Japan through the Voice of the UN Command 
(VUNC).113  Therefore, after months of broadcasts, the VUNC was technically under new 
and inexperienced supervision.  They also disseminated programming through the Korea 
Broadcasting System (KBS) via substations in Seoul, Taegu, Pusan, and Tokyo (Japan 
Broadcasting System).114   
3. PSYWAR Themes and Restrictions 
a. Themes and Objectives 
These newly established units were tasked with three primary U.S. 
psychological warfare objectives to fulfill during the war.  The first was to weaken the 
enemy’s will to fight.  The second PSYWAR objective was to ideologically defuse 
communism by undermining the enemy’s propaganda with the introduction of truth into 
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all of its messages.  The final objective was to reinforce ROK morale.115  Objectives for 
PSYWAR, unlike those of other military units, are necessarily broader.  It is impossible 
to achieve desired effects in every individual.  In its disseminated messages to the 
communist target audiences, whether through loudspeaker, leaflet, or radio broadcast, 
themes that were stressed included:  surrender to receive better treatment; surrender and 
live to see the end of the war; the superiority of UN firepower; and inevitability of defeat 
of the communist forces.116  Themes for civilians in newly occupied UN territories 
focused on undermining the communist ideologies and the disenfranchisement of the 
communist civilian populace.117  They also sought to promote the ideals of an overall 
Korean brotherhood on the peninsula and stress the overwhelming support of the nations 
of the world for the Republic of Korea.118   
b. Policy Restrictions 
Due in part to the large strategic, and more importantly, international 
impacts of PSYWAR, one of the major hindrances encountered by attempting to develop 
these PSYWAR product themes was the centralized restriction of the use of certain 
themes or topics that were deemed unmentionable by the Psychological Warfare Branch 
(PWB) through its issue of a series of Policy Guidance directives.  One example of these 
major restrictions in proposed themes that was still in effect as late as 8 November 1950 
was the “standing prohibition of reference to Chinese participation in the Korean conflict 
(Policy Guidance Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8) … until specific notice to the contrary.”119  There 
was significant lag between operational reality and the authorizing consent to produce 
products that acknowledged such events.  An example of this was noted in Policy 
Guidance directive #10, dated 3 October 1950, that specifically forbade the mention of 
the crossing of the 38th parallel by UN forces until “official announcement of such 
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crossing.”120  These types of difficulties were to be expected due to the inexperience of 
the units and the difficulties associated with establishing prescribed parameters of 
responsibility. 
4. Measuring PSYWAR Effectiveness 
a. Correlating Direct Effects 
There was a large movement within the PSYWAR community to identify 
the direct affects of their products on the enemy.  This could be deemed a study into why 
PSYWAR should even exist.  The PSYWAR leadership needed to justify their efforts in 
order to continue to maintain relevance in the Army as a whole.  The difficult part of such 
a study was the determination of appropriate measures of effectiveness backed by 
appropriate data.  In 1951, the PSYWAR leadership had taken note of the importance of 
EPW interrogation and the methods that needed to be utilized to do so effectively.  
George Pettee at the Operations Research Office led efforts to determine the effectiveness 
of “strategic” PSYWAR efforts while the ORO also concluded that the same kind of 
measures of effectiveness could be developed for tactical PSYWAR as well (mainly 
loudspeaker usage).121   
b. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Interviews 
The methods of pre-testing and post-testing psychological warfare 
products on enemy prisoners of war evolved during the Korean War.122  Also of growing 
importance was the emphasis on utilizing properly trained interrogators methodically to 
obtain information for PSYWAR products and themes from enemy prisoners of war.  
Interrogations of EPWs yielded several key pieces of information that were used to 
perfect and hone the PSYWAR messages.  As George Pettee surmised in his report in 
January 1951, “Such interrogation, unless conducted with great technical skill, produces 
 
120 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 31. 
121 Ibid., 41. 
122 Richard C. Sheldon and Henry Senft, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-6:  Preliminary Evaluation 
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only dubious and approximate indications of the effects gained.”123  In other words, one 
could not always trust the statements given by EPWs with regard to PSYWAR message 
effectiveness unless the right kinds of questions were asked.  Enemy prisoners of war 
may perceive that the best way to ensure their own personal safety is to respond with 
what they anticipate the interrogator wants to hear.  These interrogation operations 
proved of such remarkable importance to the production of effective PSYWAR products 
that today the 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian 
Internee) exists for these purposes.   
In 1951, the Operations Research Office issued a report by International 
Public Opinion Research, Inc. (IPOR) derived from interviews conducted with 238 
Chinese EPWs in Korea over a three month period.124  The purpose of the study was to 
determine the effect of U.S. leaflets on the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF).  The 
results verified the lack of analysis of potential target audiences by U.S. PSYWAR 
forces.  The report stated that there was “no evidence that leaflets had been concentrated 
on troops who were particularly prone to surrender.”125  Although 63 percent of the 
interviewees stated that they had been influenced to surrender by leaflets, this was just 
one of many aspects that precipitated their decision.126  Loudspeakers and radio 
broadcasts only accounted for decisions of 10 percent of the interviewees to surrender.127  
This might have been due, in large part, to the dearth of loudspeaker units and equipment 
being operated by U.S. forces, as well as the lack of radio access available to the CCF 
forces.  The report highlighted that, not only were the CCF forces more likely be directly 
affected by the leaflets than were North Korean soldiers, but also that ex-CNA (Chinese 
Nationalist Army) veterans were the group of the communist forces most susceptible to 
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the messages.128  It was also learned that among the CCF, the average soldier would 
purposely acquire and conceal leaflets despite the threats of their officers.129  During one 
study it was noted that due to the multiple versions of surrender leaflets that had been 
drawn up, possibly bred by the “quantity versus quality” mentality, confusion and 
indecision were prominent results.  One CCF soldier had been saving many leaflets that 
encouraged surrender and he finally gave up.  He had actually prolonged surrendering in 
case the UN forces dropped another leaflet that would render his others obsolete.130   
In a sister report of the one on the CCF, the same research unit conducted 
768 interviews with North Korean EPWs over the same time period.131  The analysts’ 
methods of questioning enabled them to receive more valid feedback from the EPWs in 
determining what themes worked under given conditions.  The two most important 
aspects of the interviews were that (1) they were conducted in a “conversational 
framework” and (2) the questions that were asked were “indirect and open-ended.”132  
This made it much less likely that the data set could be skewed by the biases or fears of 
the captive EPW audience.133  Most interesting about the North Korean surrenderers was 
their susceptibility to messages delivered by Korean villagers whom they met.  More than 
half of the surrenderers had listed this as one of the aspects that led them to capitulate.134  
Leaflets were mentioned as the second most prominent reason.135  Therefore, the high 
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Psychological Operations, 36. 
134 Kendall, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-12:  An Evaluation of PSYWAR Influence on North 
Korean Troops, v-viii. 
135 Only 3 percent mentioned that leaflets were the sole “reason” why they surrendered.  Ibid.   
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susceptibility to the messages of appeal by other “Korean brothers” on the peninsula was 
precisely where U.S. PSYWAR should have been focused.   
c. Environmental Conditions 
The realization derived from the aforementioned studies was that the 
particular conditions that soldiers operate under are the most important aspects in 
inducing their surrender.  Especially noteworthy was the lack of differentiating effects in 
soldiers of “different ages, education, civilian occupation, marital status, and place of 
residence.”136  Thus, persuasion was linked to the exploitation of the immediate 
environmental conditions and vulnerabilities of the combat soldier.  Clearly the CCF 
enlisted soldiers were the most susceptible to the PSYWAR messages.137  Conversely, the 
North Korean officers were the absolute least susceptible to the effects of the PSYWAR 
disseminations.138  Notably, in a 1953 ORO report, the authors made the recommendation 
that “surrender-mission psywar” be crafted for specific target audiences.139  
Unfortunately many of these recommendations came too late to affect positive change in 
PSYWAR effectiveness during the war.  However, such recommendations did help to 
facilitate positive steps toward the creation of more viable PSYWAR doctrine for future 
conflicts. 
d. Operation Moolah 
Considered by many to be the most effective PSYWAR effort during the 
war was Operation Moolah, in the spring of 1953.140  This is highly arguable, however, 
since the program did not achieve its desired results.  This operation was an attempt by 
the United States to offer money as an incentive to obtain a defecting pilot with a Soviet 
MIG.  The leaflets that were disseminated offered a $50,000141 reward to any MIG pilot 
 
136 Kendall, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-12:  An Evaluation of PSYWAR Influence on North 
Korean Troops, vii. 
137 Lessing A. Kahn and Julius Segal, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-40:  Psychological Warfare 
and Other Factors Affecting the Surrender of North Korean and Chinese Forces (Chevy Chase, Maryland:  
Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1953), 3. 
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139 Ibid., 4. 
140 Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953, 68. 
141 The equivalent in 2005 of more than approximately $354,000. 
38 
 
                                                
who successfully defected with his aircraft.142  A bonus of an additional $50,000 was also 
offered to the first defector to do so.143  The leaflets and radio broadcasts were developed 
and disseminated in Chinese, Korean, and Russian.144  Shortly after the broadcasts began 
it was noted that the Russian versions were being jammed from somewhere in North 
Korea.145  Soon thereafter, the North Korean to U.S. kill ratio in air combat soared to 
fifty-five to one.146  This denoted that the pilots who were now flying were clearly not the 
best ones.  It was assumed that the North Koreans had replaced the Soviet pilots now 
flying the MIGs.147  While no MIG pilot defected during the war as a result of this 
PSYWAR program, one did defect two months after the signing of the armistice.148  
Upon interrogation, however, it was learned that the pilot had neither seen leaflets nor 
heard broadcasts; he was merely disenchanted with communism.149  The “success” of the 
program was the period in which the communists greatly curtailed their sorties and then 
ceased them altogether for a period of eight days.150  This was not, however, the desired 
objectives that PSYWAR was striving to achieve.151  
D. PSYWAR LESSONS OF THE KOREAN WAR 
Although heavy research, development, and procurement operations for 
PSYWAR specific equipment such as mobile leaflet production centers and mobile 
broadcasting radio stations were underway after the start of the war, it was the emphasis 
on the personnel training and PSYWAR methodologies that were the most drastically in 
need of improvement.152  Many of the problems that PSYWAR experienced during the 
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Korean War were due mainly to their lack of training and expertise in key areas.  Such 
shortcomings led to indiscriminate leafleting, an overabundance of themes, poor target 
audience analysis, and poor intelligence.  However, these areas are all inextricably linked 
to the initial deficiencies in PSYWAR training that were inherent to the Korean War 
psychological warfare units. 
1. Indiscriminate Leafleting 
Some of the critical lessons learned by the leadership in the psychological warfare 
community during the war were articulated in a report prepared by PSYWAR officers 
and forwarded to the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 28 
August 1953.  One shortcoming addressed in this report was concerned with the 
dissemination of leaflets to target audiences, specifically, the inability to accurately put 
paper on the desired target.153  The interrogation of EPWs had yielded a host of data to 
illustrate that, despite the tons of leaflets that were dropped, not all communist soldiers 
had actually come into contact with many leaflets, and some had not at all.154  This led 
the author of the report to speculate that due to dissemination of nearly one billion 
leaflets per year, one of two plausible outcomes must have occurred.  It was true that 
either, “the enemy is walking about in miles of leaflets up to his ankles” or, “if he hasn’t 
seen them [the leaflets] as the [E]PW reports indicate, the billions of leaflets disseminated 
are being wasted on untenanted terrain.”155  This report effectively condemned the 
concept   of   simply   attempting   to   “blanket”   the   foreign countryside with leaflets.  
Feedback such as this also led years later to a scientific study in the dissemination of 
leaflets via leaflet bomb and the determination of practical calculations to achieve more 
precise leafleting.156  
 
153 Avedon, A Study of Psychological Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign– A Study, 
3. 
154 Ibid., 4. 
155 Ibid. 
156 This included the calculation of the bomb release point and function point (detonation of the leaflet 
bomb). Such calculations are based on wind speed, direction of drift, and kind of paper utilized to cover 
effectively the desired target with about 90 percent of the leaflets in the bomb (about 10 percent of leaflets 
are so erratic that where they land cannot be effectively predicted).  Headquarters, 7th Psychological 
Operations Group, Low, Medium, and High Altitude Leaflet Dissemination Guide (San Francisco:  7th 
Psychological Operations Group), 86.   
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2. Too Many Themes 
Also voiced in the report was that the disseminated messages conveyed too wide 
of an array of themes that were not mutually supportive of one another.  The plausible 
result was the over stimulation of the enemy, or “propaganda fatigue,” that may have 
conflicted enemy soldiers as they attempted to act in accordance with these messages.157  
This was also the result of having multiple PSYWAR entities producing, printing, and 
disseminating leaflets without coordination or communication with one another.  These 
entities were able to conduct decentralized operations without any sort of planning 
coordination involved.  This disjointedness was fueled by the conventional Army’s 
emphasis on mass amounts of leaflets as a concrete measure of PSYWAR efforts.  This 
disregard for the judicial use of leaflets, the emphasis on the “quantity rather than quality 
of propaganda,”158 further risked conditioning the enemy into ignoring the leaflets as 
commonplace.159   
3. Poor Target Audience Analysis 
Feedback revealed problems in dissemination across all PSYWAR media and 
reported that target audiences were not receiving messages that were commensurate with 
their given level of literacy.  It was noted that, “PSYWAR personnel, especially in Eighth 
Army and certainly including an appreciable portion of the PWS [Psychological Warfare 
Section] staff, were inexperienced and untrained.”160  Also, those foreign personnel 
(Korean and Chinese) who were hired to provide language expertise in the development 
of PSYWAR products were in many cases unwilling to “stoop” to the level of the 
commoners’ language.161  For a translator to use less aristocratic forms of the language 
 
157 Avedon, A Study of Psychological Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign– A Study, 
5.  Harry S. Truman Papers, “Memorandum of Conversation between LTC Weaver, Dr. Allen, Charles 
Johnson, Dr. Craig, and Mr. MacDonald, Dr. Allen’s office, 1500 06 May 1952” (White House Central 
Files:  Psychological Strategy Board Files, 1951-1953), 2. 
158 Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, 307. 
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would cause him to lose face and was therefore unacceptable.162  Also, many of the radio 
products that were produced by the PWS “were in a format and mood that smacked of 
Hollywood and the writers’ awareness of Occidental styles and preferences.”163  Clearly, 
the ad hoc forming and training of these PSYWAR organizations had not lent itself 
toward being proficient in languages, customs, or cultures of the Far East.  Captain 
Avedon also noted that “repeated attempts to procure qualified Chinese or Korean 
personnel met with failure.”164     
4. Poor Intelligence and Evaluation 
Another deficiency noted was the severe lack of data that existed about the size of 
potential radio broadcast target audiences.165  The underlying necessity was the need for 
relevant intelligence and demographic analyses of specific target audiences for 
prescribing appropriate broadcast programming.166  The PSYWAR radio scripts were 
mostly “broadcast without having been checked for accuracy of translation by a US 
citizen…”167  The report also analyzed the systemic inadequacies for receiving feedback 
on disseminated products.  These processes help to refine future PSYWAR products.  In 
short, there were no systems in place: 
For all practical purposes, no evaluation of FEC psywar programs is 
conducted.  Program personnel are relying on (1) criticism from foreign 
nations on the PWS translation and announcing staff, (2) occasional 
criticism from Plans and Policies, Operations, and high officials in PWS, 
(3) occasional letters from [S]outh Korean listeners, or (4) occasional 
comments from informed outsiders.168   
 
 
162 Avedon, A Study of Psychological Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign– A Study, 
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167 “[T]his was the case with all Korean scripts during the period under study.”  Wilbur Schramm, 
Technical Memorandum ORO-T-20:  FEC Psychological Warfare Operations:  Radio (Chevy Chase, 
Maryland:  Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, February 1952), 3, 70. 
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5. Poor Training 
Poor training was the most predominant underlying factor across the myriad of 
PSYWAR shortcomings in the Korean War:   
It is apparent that the men feel their own preparation was inadequate in at 
least three important respects – area training, language training, and 
previous psywar experience.  In the opinion of ORO the analysts, the lack 
of area training was so important as to justify the future elimination of 
almost any other kind of psywar training for appropriate personnel…169
Avedon’s report also noted the severe lack in operational capability of PSYWAR 
loudspeaker personnel.  He further stated that, “the principal weakness in all psywar 
operations and no more noteworthy among the loudspeaker teams than in other psywar 
operations on all levels, is the lack of experienced, trained, qualified personnel.”170  Not 
only did his report highlight that personnel were deficient in PSYWAR training, but in 
general Army training as well.171     
Pettee similarly noted that in tactical loudspeaker operations specific “attention 
must be given to producing psywar materials of effective content, and not merely to 
physical production and dissemination.”172  In other words, the crafting of an appropriate 
message  in   the   target   audience’s  language  was  essential  to  effective psychological 
warfare and simply broadcasting “surrender” messages in situations that were not 
conducive for the enemy to surrender would, by contrast, be utterly ineffective.173  
Furthermore, Pettee stated that: 
Content-production capacity…calls for skilled language ability, that can 
put the message not merely into the scholars [sic] version of the enemy 
language, but into the common idiom that will sound familiar to the 
enemy soldiers…The language function calls for a genuine language 
knowledge.  It is no better to address a Chinaman [sic] in the language of a 
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part of China which he does not know, than it is to use the dialect of 
Brooklyn on a Texas audience.  Psywar can, of course, get results without 
such “refinement,” but its real capabilities will never be measured by such 
results. 174
Insufficient training was a predominant issue presented in Captain Avedon’s 
report to the Psychological Warfare Center due to its ramifications throughout the 
entirety of PSYWAR operations in the Far East Theater.  During the duration of the 
Korean War, the 1st L&L Company had a total of only “about six or seven section leaders 
and two CO’s [commanding officers] who had been trained in psywar.”175  One may 
presume that throughout the latter stages of the Korean War, soldiers trained in 
psychological warfare would finally have arrived in theater.  Incredulously, Avedon notes 
that: 
There never has been one, repeat one, enlisted graduate of the PsyWar 
School assigned to psywar in the Far East.  There never have been psywar 
personnel who were area specialists.  There never have been psywar 
personnel who were linguists with the exception of one officer who was 
not fluent in the pertinent language.  There never have been loudspeaker 
or radio announcers who were psywar trained…176  
Lieutenant Colonel John Weaver traveled to the Far East area of operations in the 
spring of 1952 to assess ongoing psychological warfare operations.  Among his 
assessments that were provided to the Psychological Strategy Board were that training in 
both media operations and propaganda were paramount to PSYWAR soldiers, but “the 
ideal, however, would be to have area specialists [including language specialization] who 
could be trained in propaganda techniques.”177  Also,  noted  by  George  Pettee  was  that  
 
174 Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 66. 
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Johnson, Dr. Craig, and Mr. MacDonald, Dr. Allen’s office,” 3. 
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effective loudspeaker tactical operations could only be made effective through the 
training in “specific psywar skill, language skill, and intensive liaison and indoctrination 
activities.”178   
Wilbur Schramm wrote an ORO report on PSYWAR radio operations during the 
Korean War and heavily emphasized the role of PSYWAR, language, and cultural 
training.  He asserted that “The potential effectiveness of the operation has…been 
severely limited by the absence of training in the culture and language of the target 
audience, and by the fact that there is almost no previous psywar experience anywhere on 
the staff.”179  He further characterized the radio operations as hampered by the fact that: 
The propaganda writers tend to be young men, who have had neither area 
nor language training adequate to their task.  They have no way of judging 
whether the English scripts they produce are suited to the target; 
moreover, the scripts are translated into a language that they do not 
understand, and are often broadcast without having been checked for 
accuracy of translation by a US citizen…180
Therefore, Schramm prescribed the “cultural and linguistic training of psywar 
personnel”181 while making the clear distinction that, “Mere interpreters are not 
sufficient.”182  He further discussed that: 
There is a need for a far greater supply of skills, and of training to provide 
it, as regards the language of the target audience, its culture, and its 
communications system.  (No US citizen in the employ of PWS 
[psychological warfare staff] was able to check scripts produced by PWS 
in Japan after they had been translated into Korean, the only Korean-
speaking American in the unit having been assigned to 
Korea…Furthermore, no one in the radio company had gone through 
systematic area training in Korean or Chinese culture, and in fact most of 
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the members of the unit did not know the barest rudiments of the culture to 
which they were expected to communicate.”183
E. IMPLICATIONS 
By end of the Korean War in 1953, psychological warfare forces had gained 
experience and knowledge that were beneficial to improving combat PSYWAR.  
However, the end of the war also led to the reemergence of the “PSYWAR syndrome.”  
Despite the gradual atrophy of the PSYWAR forces, the predominant difference when 
contrasted with the post-World War II time period was the continued existence of 
PSYWAR units in the peacetime Army.  Furthermore, the Psychological Warfare Center 
and School both maintained PSYWAR institutional knowledge and furthered the research 
of PSYWAR principles.  Many of the lessons that were learned during the Korean War 
were subsequently addressed prior to and during the Vietnam War.  However, despite 
numerous past references to the importance of training in PSYWAR, regional, cultural, 
and linguistic training, these issues remain inadequately addressed to this day.  In the 
words of Wilbur Schramm, “Why should not the nation be training future psywar 
personnel in a number of cultures and a number of languages?”184
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III. THE DPRK:  A FORMIDABLE PSYOP CHALLENGE 
If you are looking for an easy war, fight an information-controlling 
state.…If you are hunting a difficult conflict, enter the civil strife that 
arises after the collapse of an information-controlling state.185
A. DPRK INFORMATION CONTROL AND REGIME SECURITY 
1. Methodology versus Mysticism 
For over half a century the diabolical term brainwashing186 has been used by 
numerous authors and analysts to describe the brand of North Korean information control 
that it exercises over its populace.187  While such terminology connotes an arcane and 
perhaps irresistible succumbing of individuals to propaganda, the North Korean system of 
information control is much more methodological than mystical.  The usage of 
brainwashing to characterize the perpetuation of communist ideologies took root in an 
era when the use of subliminal messages was feared as a means of subversion.188  These 
beliefs were further propelled by such Hollywood portrayals of subliminal brainwashing 
 
185 Ralph Peters, “Spotting the Losers:  Seven Signs of Non-competitive States,” Parameters 28, no. 1 
(Spring 1998):  39. 
186 “This rather frightening term was originally used to describe the persuasion tactics used on 
American prisoners in Communist Chinese prison camps during the Korean War.  These camps were 
totalitarian environments in which the captors came to control the thoughts of the POWs [prisoners of war] 
by controlling all sources of information and by systemically rewarding and punishing appropriate and 
inappropriate thought.”  Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Age of Propaganda:  The Everyday Use 
and Abuse of Persuasion, rev. ed. (New York:  Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 305. 
187 See the following for more recent examples:  Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey 
Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) 
(Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), “The DPRK Report, No. 5” (January-February 1997); available from 
URL:  http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/dprkrprt/97janfeb.htm; internet; last accessed March 2005.  Selig S. 
Harrison, Korean Endgame:  A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 14.  Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula:  
How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea (New York:  McGraw-Hill, 2003), 25.  Bradley K. Martin, Under 
the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader:  North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (New York:  St. Martin’s 
Press, 2004), 361. 
188 “Despite the claims in books and newspapers and on the backs of subliminal self-help tapes, 
subliminal influence tactics have not been demonstrated to be effective.”  Pratkanis and Aronson, Age of 
Propaganda:  The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion, 292-293. 
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as in the 1962 film, The Manchurian Candidate.189  Despite the fact that such myths have 
since been dispelled, the description of the North Korean brand of information control is 
still rendered in such mysterious terms.  What is true, however, is that the “North 
Koreans have been exposed to massive and sustained indoctrination and an 
‘organizational life’ shielded from external sources of influence”190 through the “…depth, 
ubiquity, and never-ending self-parody of regime propaganda...”191 for more than fifty 
years. 
2. Manufacturing Truth 
The successive communist regimes of Kim Il-sung and son Kim Jong-il have 
dominated all facets of the lives of the indigenous North Korean population for decades.  
In doing so, these regimes have actively utilized propaganda as their primary means of 
inculcating communist ideologies and both creating and perpetuating the mythologies of 
the party leadership among the populace.  Therefore, when the truth does not exist to 
support the goals of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), it is merely manufactured and 
magnified: 
The state’s propaganda machine constructs and repeats absurd myths 
about these two [Kims].  Sometimes the myths are built on a kernel of 
truth; sometimes they are pure fabrication.192
These methods were utilized effectively during the generation of the communist Korean 
War veterans; however, they appear to be even more ingrained in the fabric of 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) society within its post-Korean War 
generations.  This is a direct result of the heavy indoctrination that all elements of society  
 
189 “The movie, starring Angela Lansbury, Frank Sinatra, and Laurence Harvey, tells the story of an 
American soldier captured during the Korean War and brainwashed by the Chinese Communists.  The 
POW is programmed to go into a hypnotic trance and to assassinate U.S. political leaders on command.”  
Pratkanis and Aronson, Age of Propaganda:  The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion, 21. 
190 Young C. Kim, “North Korea in 1974,” Asian Survey 15, no. 1 (January 1975):  51. 
191 Bruce Cumings, North Korea:  Another Country (New York:  The New Press, 2004), 141. 




                                                
undergo from the youngest of children to the most elder members.  This fanaticism has 
served to promote the legitimacy and strengthen the powerbase of the Kim regimes for a 
number of years.   
 After the Korean War, the North Korean communists, under the leadership of 
Kim Il-sung, conducted propaganda operations against such target audiences as U.S. 
forces, Republic of Korea (ROK) forces and civilians, and most distinctively – their own 
civilians and military forces.  The latter was clear evidence of the protective nature of the 
communists for their ideologies and their fear of vulnerability to U.S. psychological 
warfare.  True of that era and no less so today is that, “The North Koreans believe that no 
matter how absurd or spurious the propaganda, given time and repeated propagation, it 
can develop a veneer of credibility or, at the least, plausibility in susceptible minds.”193  
Such methods are representative of those utilized by Joseph Goebbels during his 
propaganda campaigns of World War II in that, “What the masses term truth is that 
information which is most familiar.”194  Goebbels asserted that: 
The rank and file are usually much more primitive than we imagine.  
Propaganda must therefore always be essentially simple and repetitious.  
In the long run only he will achieve basic results in influencing public 
opinion who is able to reduce problems to the simplest terms and who has 
the courage to keep forever repeating them in this simplified form despite 
the objections of intellectuals.*195
Therefore, no level of absurdity in propaganda is so great that it cannot be made 
believable through repetitious dissemination.196  This has been a dominant practice of 
both Kim regimes throughout the years and shows no signs of changing at present.  While 
North Korean propaganda had little affect on U.S. forces during the Korean War, the 
 
193 Strategic Studies Detachment, “Special PSYOP Assessment:  Potential North Korean Propaganda 
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manipulation of their own military forces and civilians was masterful and continued well 
after the signing of the armistice.  Their efforts were enhanced by the draconian isolation 
of its populace following the end of combat operations that has remained the status quo 
to this day.  Thus, the state’s media control, message repetition, and heavy indoctrination 
when compounded with decades of shielding its citizens from external influences have 
enabled the communist Kim regimes to define their own “truths” among the North 
Koreans of today. 
3. Anti-Americanism:  A Central Theme 
In the years since the armistice agreement, anti-Americanism has been one of the 
most consistently pursued themes propagated by the Kim regime to shape the perceptions 
of successive generations of DPRK citizens.  The Museum of American Imperialist 
Atrocities in the North Korean city of Sinchon attests to the extreme methods that the 
DPRK propaganda machine is prepared to use to demonize the United States.197  This 
serves as a counterpoint to reinforce official mythologies surrounding the regime leaders 
that both legitimize their rule and glorify their “revolutionary achievements.”   
The regime’s obsessive anti-Americanism testifies to the general xenophobia that 
pervades the North Korean culture, a xenophobia that conditions the minds of the post-
Korean War generations.  Anti-American themes enable the regime to promote 
maintenance of its national security through its drastic “military first” policy.198  This has 
proven effective despite the calamitous social policies that have produced such severe 
and devastating famines experienced in the DPRK beginning in the mid-1990s.199   
 The propaganda apparatus of the DPRK has successfully evolved since 1953 and 
has proven an effective means of control and stability for the Kim regimes and the 
Korean Workers’ Party.  North Korea’s adept application of information control in 
executing its domestic policies has allowed it to face numerous economic and agricultural  
 
197 Strategic Studies Detachment, Basic PSYOP Study:  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina:  4th Psychological Operations Group, June 1980), I-5. 
198 Cumings, North Korea:  Another Country, 189. 
199 It is estimated that anywhere from 500,000 to one million North Koreans died as a result of the 
devastating famines.  Ibid., 178. 
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setbacks, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and over a half-century of bold opposition 
from the U.S.-ROK alliance, without the much anticipated “collapse” that has been 
prophesied for years.200   
A large part of his [Kim Il-sung’s] objective clearly was to make the 
population inaccessible to propaganda and other subversion efforts.  While 
the South Koreans and Americans liked to imagine that isolation would 
threaten his rule, Kim believed that even more isolation was the way to 
preserve his system.  In more than four decades to come, he was never 
proved wrong about that.201
Thus, the DPRK has proven that its societal grip is not just a passing phase.  After years 
of being subjected to anti-American indoctrination, the North Korean populace has an 
understandably distorted view of the United States.  Such perceptions could profoundly 
inhibit the future abilities of U.S. forces to conduct effective stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, or even combat operations, on the Korean peninsula.   
4. Chapter Methodology 
This chapter focuses on the DPRK’s domestic propaganda apparatus, and its 
objectives, indoctrination methods, and information control throughout the years from the 
Korean War to the present.  The first part will survey North Korean propaganda during 
the reign of Kim Il-sung.  The second part will focus on the time period encompassing 
Kim Jong-il’s reign up until the present.  It is very important to note that this is neither a 
comprehensive account of the past domestic propaganda of the DPRK, nor a complete 
measure of their future capabilities.  Little is published on the subject of North Korean 
domestic propaganda, which is surprising given that propaganda is a key component of 
power and control in all communist regimes.  However, ignorance is most certainly due 
in large part to the extreme isolation of the North Korean populace under the regime’s 
revival of a modern day “Hermit Kingdom.” 
 
 
200 The “Big Bang [theory] refers to a sudden internal collapse of North Korea and the ensuing chaos.”  
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B. PROPAGANDA UNDER KIM IL-SUNG 
1. North Korean Psychological Warfare:  1950-1953 
Psychological warfare played a central and significant role in communist North 
Koreans’ war fighting strategies during the Korean War.  Their propaganda machine 
actively targeted a host of varied audiences including their own civilians and military.  
Many of their propaganda operations adapted Stalinist or Maoist practices, while others 
were even modeled on U.S. concepts.202  These imitations and the heavy measures that 
the North Koreans undertook psychologically to inoculate their forces, betrayed the 
communist fears of the threat posed by credible U.S. PSYWAR.203  Similar to the 
message dissemination techniques that were utilized against them, the communists 
likewise conducted leaflet operations, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker operations.  
However, they further expanded their propaganda activities to include agitation and the 
massive use of communist workers to blend propaganda with organizational structure.204   
The North Korean propaganda activities were fully coordinated with their 
invasion force as it attacked into South Korea.  Their preparation was underscored by a 
broadcast disseminated to the North Korean populace by the DPRK Department of the 
Interior on 25 June 1950: 
The South Korean puppet national defense army suddenly attacked North 
Korea at the 38th parallel, in the early morning of June 25.  The enemy 
attacked at three points (names of the places omitted here) and advanced 
from one to two miles.  The Department of the Interior of the Democratic 
People’s Republic has ordered its police forces to beat off the invading 
forces.  At present, the Republic’s police guard is resisting the enemy, and 
a severe defensive war is in progress.*205
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The communists directed propaganda against their own soldiers to mitigate the 
effects of any U.S. PSYWAR products that might reach them.  North Korean soldiers 
were routinely indoctrinated before impending contact with enemy forces.  Each North 
Korean Army (NKA) division had a “cultural section” that was comprised of 
approximately 250 personnel whose responsibilities included assurance of the political 
indoctrination of communist units.206  These cultural sections claimed that U.S. forces 
invariably executed any prisoners of war.207   
Reports told of lectures and mass rallies being held to indoctrinate enemy 
soldiers against the leaflets.  Soldiers were being threatened with reprisals 
against their families if they should surrender.  Troops were exhorted to 
commit suicide rather than face torture and execution by United Nations 
forces.  They were reminded that they would be shot by their own security 
troops if they should attempt surrender.208
Themes alleging the barbarity of U.S. soldiers were common as were claims of the 
chemical-biological contamination of U.S. leaflets.209  This was a preemptive effort by 
the communists to stop their soldiers from picking up the leaflets, thereby preventing the 
U.S. message from even being read.  Leaflets that depicted the guaranteed medical care 
and humane treatment granted to U.S. enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) as a compelling 
reason for surrender were twisted by the communists as examples of the horrible 
atrocities of U.S. germ warfare experimentation.210  Black bars were routinely printed 
over EPW faces in the U.S. leaflet pictures to protect their identities.  However, this 
practice was discontinued after repeated claims by the communists that such alterations 
were necessary to conceal the disfigurements that resulted from the gross human 
experimentation that was conducted on United States held prisoners of war.211   
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 While the North Koreans were adept at propagandizing their own people, their 
messages tended to have little affect on the U.S. forces.  Part of the lack of success of 
communist propaganda directed toward U.S. forces may have been attributable to the 
high usage of political themes “...which often called upon GIs to end ‘the unjust war,’ 
‘send a message to Truman,’ ‘Bring the Troops Home,’ etc.”212  Furthermore, the North 
Korean propagandists were also hindered by the shortage of available aircraft that 
rendered their dissemination of leaflets “rare.”213  Leaflets were one of the U.S. 
PSYWAR establishment’s most utilized forms of dissemination, yet the same mass 
quantities could not be matched by the communists.  Regardless of the dissemination 
means, however, the North Koreans exhibited a relatively unified thematic focus.  The 
more prominent themes that were stressed included the emancipation of women, 
emancipation of labor, redistribution of land, Korean nationalism and communist 
ideologies, and unification.214  Although it would later change in the years after the 
Korean War, North Korea’s theme for reunification was defined as “unification by 
force.”215    
 The DPRK propaganda methodologies were characterized as “an unbreakable 
system of constant public indoctrination plus a ruthless policing system to keep the 
populace under control.”216  As further initiatives to ensure audience attentiveness, 
“People were stopped in the street by the police and quizzed to see if they had 
remembered the message of the latest propaganda campaign.”217   
 As Seoul changed hands and was occupied by the North Koreans, once for as long 
as three months, the North Korean psychological warfare campaigns were vigorous and 
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unrelenting.218  Posters depicting communism’s key leaders were brightly displayed 
everywhere and stood in sharp contrast to the war ravaged surroundings.219  The North 
Koreans also employed loudspeakers, handbills, and mandatory indoctrination lectures to 
influence the masses.220  In themes eerily similar to those espoused in contemporary U.S. 
operations in Iraq:  
While they occupied parts of the South the Northerners tried to portray 
themselves positively as liberators, but with only mixed results.  
Communist propagandists sought to make the best of the American 
intervention by attacking the Rhee [South Korean] regime for flunkeyism, 
in an appeal to South Koreans’ nationalist feelings.221
As the armistice took root, North Korea enhanced and expanded their propaganda 
apparatuses to extend their control over their people.  Thus, their grip on state-controlled 
information solidified with the cessation of combat operations and subsequent reduction 
in U.S. PSYWAR activities.   
2. Post-Korean War Propaganda 
a. Countering Operation Jilli 
The propaganda war did not end with the signing of the armistice.  The 
North Koreans continued to engage in a number of operations that attempted to subvert 
operations in the south.  The United States and the Republic of Korea continued to 
disseminate leaflets and conduct radio broadcasts for a number of years.  Operation Jilli 
was one such leaflet program conducted by U.S. psychological operations units in the 
mid-1960s.222   Radio broadcasts continued to be of little use to the U.S. PSYOP forces 
due to the low availability of radios among the North Korean people.223  Though the 
North Koreans possessed a high literacy rate, the United States was unable to exploit this 
characteristic because the dissemination of leaflets via leaflet artillery shell or leaflet 
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bomb would constitute a breach of the armistice agreement.224  Thus, the U.S. PSYOP 
units began employing leaflet balloons both to circumvent the explicit proscriptions set 
forth in the armistice agreement and to inject truth into the information-deprived North 
Korean populace.  The first such mission took place in 1964 and resulted in the 
dissemination of millions of leaflets into North Korea.225  While the North Koreans had 
employed leaflet balloons for a number of years, their operations were not of nearly the 
scale of those launched in execution of Operation Jilli.226  Interviews were conducted 
with North Korean defectors to determine the effectiveness of these U.S. PSYOP 
products.  The “respondents were also unanimous in their opinion that the North Korean 
Communists are now forced to reevaluate their existing internal political indoctrination of 
the people and their propaganda output directed at the South Korean audience, in order to 
cope with the constant pressure applied by Operation Jilli.”227  Consequently, the North 
Korean regime was forced to undertake substantial counterpropaganda techniques to 
mitigate the effects of Operation Jilli.  Such techniques included the mass gathering of 
leaflets for incineration followed by speeches refuting the leaflets’ themes.228  Further, 
the PSYOP analysts noted that, “The success of the Jilli program has been underscored 
by the use of Jilli themes and techniques by the North Koreans in their own leaflet 
dissemination program.”229  Also, analyses of “the North Korean Labor Party newspaper 
over a ten-month period has revealed a four to five-fold increase in what can be 
interpreted as counter-Operation Jilli, pro-North Korea, propaganda (specifically, in 
newspapers three months prior to, and seven months following, the start of Jilli leaflet 
drops).”230  Hence, the conduct of Operation Jilli appeared inadvertently to help North 
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Korea hone their own leaflet efforts as their styles and themes soon began to “coincide 
with the basic principles used in producing leaflets for Operation Jilli.”231
b. Writing is Believing 
The North Koreans have historically concerned themselves with extracting 
“confessions” from POWs that articulate that their actions were wrong and that the 
communists were both fair in treatment and valid in ideology.  These confession 
techniques have been evidenced several times since the signing of the armistice including 
the sailors taken prisoner from the captured USS Pueblo in 1968.232  These methods are 
reminiscent of the Chinese attempts to convert U.S. POWs to communism during the 
Korean War and their reliance on the written word: 
And the Chinese knew that, as a commitment device, a written declaration 
has some great advantages.  First, it provides physical evidence that the act 
occurred….A second advantage of a written testament is that it can be 
shown to other people.  Of course, that means it can be used to persuade 
those people.  People have a natural tendency to think that a statement 
reflects the true attitude of the person who made it.  What is surprising is 
that they continue to think so even when they know that the person did not 
freely choose to make the statement.233
Therefore, for the North Korean propagandists it is true that “writing is believing.”234    
c. The Propaganda and Agitation Department 
The overall control of the multi-faceted DPRK propagandist media and 
societal activities rests with the KWP’s Propaganda and Agitation Department.235  The 
Korean People’s Army (KPA) has historically possessed some of its own control of 
propaganda operations as well.  During the mid-1960s it was noted that the General 
Political Bureau of the KPA had a Propaganda and Instigation Bureau; however, this 
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agency primarily functioned to conduct external propaganda activities.236  The KWP, for 
purposes of informational control, developed “a sophisticated domestic and international 
propaganda organization to propagate Kimist ideas and further its peninsular goals.”237  
The same purposes of maintaining power and control have remained constant throughout 
the years as has government centralized control of all forms of media consolidated at the 
KWP level.  Furthermore,     
…radios available to ordinary citizens…were fixed so that they could 
receive only government broadcasts.  The newspapers purveyed strictly 
the party line.238  
The facts, lies, embellishments, and myths that the KWP promotes are disseminated with 
national authority throughout the country while international information is carefully 
filtered at the highest echelons before any domestic distribution is authorized. 
3. The Monolithism of Juche 
 Throughout the evolution of North Korea, one of the most unifying propaganda 
concepts has proven to be “juche.”  Juche, or Kim Il-sung’s “self-reliance” ideology, was 
first vocalized in 1948, but was not brought into the forefront of DPRK propaganda until 
a couple of years after the signing of the 1953 armistice.239  This “autarkic autonomy” 
strategy pursued under the rubric of juche was the “idiosyncratic developmental 
alternative based on a blend of ethnocentric nationalism, Stalinist jargon, and Korea’s 
‘hermit kingdom’ legacy.”*240  The juche ideology was advanced due in no small part to 
the geographical boundaries that the regime utilized to isolate the North Korean people 
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and bolster state monopoly of information.  While these constraints prevented outside 
influences from penetrating the society, the promotion of the juche concept served to 
answer all of the questions of why the society sacrificed in the way that it did.  Therefore, 
juche was “a viable rationalization for existing societal and economic shortcomings.”241  
In other words, the individual sacrifice and hard work ethic exhibited by the populace 
helped to preserve the overall good of the society.   
 Agitation and propaganda operations heavily emphasized juche idealisms and 
simultaneously advocated “the call for absolute loyalty and adoration for the Leader [Kim 
Il-sung].”242  Juche was officially declared to be “the monolithic ideology of the party” in 
1978 and was subsequently referred to as “the only thought” (yuil sasang) of the North 
Korean people.243  Clearly the “juche” concept is still to this day a prominent factor in the 
DPRK “Kimist” adaptation of Marxist-Leninist practices and has even been characterized 
as possessing adherence and reverence among North Koreans on a level comparable to 
that of a religion: 
Long before his death in 1994, Kim Il Sung had been deified as the 
personification of Korean national pride, and “Kim Il Sungism” had 
become the national faith.  The holy trinity in North Korea still consists of 
Kim the father, Kim Jong Il the son, and juche the holy spirit.244
4. Reunification of the Fatherland 
The concept of Korean reunification was a prominent propaganda theme that 
originated under the reign of Kim Il-sung but was championed by both sides during the 
Korean War.245  Domestically these themes persisted in North Korea after the war and 
also continue to constitute a large portion of today’s propaganda themes as well.  
Whereas the Korean War rhetoric focused on unification through force, the post-war 
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messages were softened to advocate a desire for peaceful reunification.246 The North 
Koreans utilized such seemingly benevolent themes yet displayed their propaganda 
prowess in that, “Despite every effort of the South Korean government to jam radio 
broadcasts and censor newspapers, northern propaganda for unification originating from 
Pyŏngyang, Kaesŏng, and Wŏnsan radio stations somehow reaches the intellectuals and 
students in the South.”247
Encouragement for reunification was originally manifested under Kim Il-sung’s 
rule in such seemingly benign activities as North Korean children’s school songs 
because, “To reunify the fatherland is the supreme national duty and the most important 
revolutionary task facing the entire Korean people.”248  Kim was continually portrayed in 
domestic propaganda as tireless in his efforts to reunify the two nations while in contrast 
it was the ROK puppet regime under the U.S. imperialist thumb that was obstructing such 
efforts.249  Noted at the celebrations honoring the twentieth anniversary of the DPRK in 
1968 was that:  
From the highest government officials to the tour guides and interpreters, 
all seemed imbued with a war mentality.  The North Koreans believed a 
war to be inevitable, and they were confident that they will fare well.  
Frequent references were made to a war of liberation and officials 
constantly talked about American imperialism.  Anti-American posters, 
many with warlike themes, were in abundance.  The intensity of the anti-
American propaganda approached a hate-America campaign.250   
In June 1974, in concert with the designation of an “Anti-American Struggle” 
month numerous public rallies were held that espoused similar themes with the most 
prominent being “that U.S. presence in South Korea is the fundamental impediment to 
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the reunification of Korea and the prime source of the evils and dangers of war.”251  In a 
speech by Kim Il-sung later that same year he stated that:  
North Korea supports and encourages the patriotic struggle of the south 
Korean people for the democratization of south Korean society.  This is 
not an [sic] interference in south Korea’s internal affairs nor is it intended 
to instigate revolution in south Korea.  For the reunification of the 
fatherland, we regard it as our noble national duty to support the just 
struggle of the south Korean people.252
Little has changed in this respect in contemporary times while the domestic propaganda 
in the DPRK continues to profess U.S.-ROK obstructionism in reunification efforts.    
5. Kim Il-sung:  The “Great Leader” 
Culturally, Kim Il-sung was represented in all facets of DPRK life.  It had been 
widely accepted for a number of years until his death in 1994 that, “All that is good, all 
innovative ideas, and all of what constitutes modern North Korea is attributed to Kim.”253  
Such depictions unified North Koreans under the pervasive view that Kim Il-sung was 
the father figure of their one national Korean family.254  To emphasize his paternal 
authority and stature as the nation’s “Great Leader,” Kim’s name was always printed in 
publications in bold type and all photographs of Kim were regarded as “sacred.”255  All 
“official photographs (those that hung in rooms and offices for ceremonial use)” were 
“treated as controlled items” by the people.256  This was widely enforced and “many 
North Koreans have risked their lives to protect these photographs, quite  possibly  out  of  
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fear of the adverse consequences of not doing so.”257  Each room in the DPRK, with the 
exception of lavatories, was required to have on display photographs of both Kim Il-sung 
and his son, Kim Jong-il.258   
The mythologies that surround Kim Il-sung, his early life, and his rise to power 
were fabricated, given deeply rooted ideological overtones, and were broadly 
disseminated throughout the country.  One such myth is Kim’s supposed 264 mile 
journey in seeking the “revolutionary truth” as a fourteen year old in 1925.259  This 
example is typical of the mythologizing of Kim’s “revolutionary” past.  Such stories 
abound and served Kim well in solidifying his powerbase and legitimacy with the people.  
Also, it was noted during the 1970s that the North Korean citizens were “encouraged” to 
show their undying loyalty for Kim Il-sung by wearing badges bearing his picture over 
their hearts.260  At least seven badges were prevalent at one time.261  More than 34,000 
monuments to Kim were erected during his lifetime.262  Clearly this manufactured 
reverence of Kim Il-sung by the North Korean people was instilled in the successive 
generations as well.  Now that such widespread and unchallenged disinformation has 
been promoted for a protracted amount of time, the deification of Kim Il-sung is no 
longer necessary – it is the truth as defined by the DPRK.   
6. Indoctrination of the Masses 
The methods of perpetuating and promoting KWP propaganda were primarily 
through the systematic use of political indoctrination.  Indoctrination was, and remains, 
prevalent throughout all social classes and ages within the society of the DPRK.  It 
focuses on key communicators such as party cadre and also on the nation’s youth.263  
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Meanwhile, mobilization propaganda focuses on the whole of the adult population.264  
While initially individuals had to adapt to such measures, the post-Korean War 
generations have been inculcated with Kim mythologies from soon after birth.  Thus, 
they are taught only that which is sanctioned by the KWP.  When children are only three 
months old their mothers go back to work while the children are monitored by state-run 
daycare centers:  
From this point on, the state becomes the dominant influence in a child’s 
life.  Often the first words a child speaks are “Papa Kim.”  At age three, 
children attend nursery school where conformance to group behavioral 
standards is stressed.  Children are taught songs lauding Kim and play 
games which depict mock battles between the “valient [sic] North Korean 
people” and the dreaded “US imperialist monster” or which illustrate the 
freeing of the “oppressed South Koreans.”265   
Around the age of ten children begin receiving their first military oriented classes.266  
Children are required to belong to special interest organizations just like the adults in the 
society.  Such organizational affiliation “provides the party [KWP] with instruments for 
indoctrination and mobilization, and it serves as a controlled forum for determining 
public opinion about government polices.”267  This prohibits the populace from being 
able to speak their minds in public if what they advocate is at all contrary to the KWP’s 
guidance.  There was little change in propaganda operations when the leadership of the 
country passed from the elder Kim to his son.  Thus, it can be seen how easily the North 
Koreans have applied the concept of the “writing is believing”268 method of persuasion 
into their daily lives -- by incorporating the concept of juche into all educational 
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C. PROPAGANDA UNDER KIM JONG-IL 
1. Early Reign of the “Dear Leader” 
 By the time of the death of the elder Kim, Kim Jong-il had already been involved 
in the communist party and the propaganda process for a number of years.  His longtime 
grooming for ascendancy to his father’s position was solidified in 1994 through Kim Il-
sung’s assertion that, “In our country, Comrade Kim Jong Il has been wisely leading the 
work of the party, the state, and the armed forces; thus the problems of succession has 
been brilliantly solved.”*269  Thus, Kim Jong-il’s rise to power was a continuation of the 
processes and institutions already successfully established under his father’s reign.  While 
considered far less charismatic than his late father, similar legitimizing mythologies were 
concocted of the “revolutionary” past of the son as well.270  Although he was really born 
outside of North Korea, the story surrounding Kim Jong-il’s birth has been revised into a 
dramatic tale taking place on the peak of Mount Paektu, the tallest mountain within either 
of the two Koreas.271  To further glorify the event it was added that, “The sky was 
brightened by a star and a double rainbow.”272  Other no less exaggerated tales insist that 
he “wrote over 1,000 books during college alone.”273  However, in addition to the 
continuing process of legitimizing Kim Jong-il’s rule, other unforeseen forces threatened 
to destabilize the regime.  
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 Not long after Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, floods, drought, and famine swept 
North Korea while the economy devastatingly plummeted.274  Yet despite the widespread 
social effects resulting from those disasters, the KWP was able to continue to tout the 
external threats of the state as a cohesive and legitimizing theme in maintaining its tight 
grip on the North Korean populace.  It was true that, “Most North Koreans still blindly 
believe that their society is the most just and prosperous in the world, and that their 
motherland is about to be invaded by imperialist and other enemies.”275  North Korea 
subsequently undertook economic reforms to attempt to improve its anachronistic 
economy that continues to struggle in an age of interdependence.  Thus, their hardships 
persist while:   
North Koreans are now expected to buy much of their own food at open 
markets rather than receiving it from the state, but inflation has risen far 
more than increases in official wages, according to a report by the U.S. 
World Food Program.  The study, released last month, found that the price 
of a liter of vegetable oil, for instance, increased threefold from September 
2003 to September 2004 to about $1.50 – an amount roughly equal to a 
week’s salary for many North Korean workers.276
Despite these market reforms, the state still retains its monopoly on information and its 
rigid prohibitions against criticisms of DPRK officials in the press.277  The success with 
which the KWP has continued to limit unauthorized information is indicative of the sad 
reality that a: 
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…considerable portion of North Korean society has lost the ability to 
perceive reality objectively, is exhausted to its limits not only physically 
(as a result of material deprivation) also psychologically by fear of the 
emergence in its thoughts of ideas “alien” to the official ideology and the 
ruling regime.278
Therefore, the regime has shown no signs that they are contemplating an abandonment of 
its “military first” policies that are so harmful to the North Korean economy.279  
Individuals who fail to adhere to the authoritarian information guidelines set forth by the 
KWP are subject to having their personal possessions confiscated, performing forced 
labor, or even execution.280   
The methods of indoctrination that were established under the rule of Kim Il-sung 
continue unabated to this day.  Political indoctrination dominates the lives of the North 
Korean people and the education system primarily accommodates the propagation of 
Kimist philosophies among students of all ages:   
The entire country devotes two hours daily to political classes.  All 
enterprises and offices spend Saturdays on political 
education…Educational institutions allocate most of their time to studying 
the teachings of the two Kims, their biographies, and the KWP’s 
history.…In secondary schools, stories about the two Kims and their 
teachings are studied in all details and are supposed to be the most 
important subject.  At the college level, juche-ism dominates the 
curriculum and requires thousands of hours of classwork and homework.  
At factories and offices…participants recite editorials of central 
newspapers, swear to fight “American imperialism” and its “lackeys” in 
Seoul, and recount their own contributions to the cause of juche-ism.281   
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Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s repetitive propaganda themes disseminated through these 
indoctrination programs have allowed the Kim regime continually to avoid publicly 
addressing the harsh realities of life in North Korea.  Its “state-sponsored brainwashing 
has succeeded remarkably well with its captive and isolated audience, which blames the 
outside world for most of its problems and reveres its leaders (especially the late Kim Il 
Sung).”282   
2. Propaganda Themes 
Today few changes distinguish North Korean propaganda themes from those of 
the immediate post-Korean War era.  There are no aspects of North Korean society that 
are excluded from the dominating control of the Korean Workers’ Party.283  The “official 
cultural model” continues to be socialist realism, which elevates the roles of the two 
Kims in the overarching ideological perpetuation of communist philosophies.284  Socialist 
realism “does not espouse a ‘realistic’ or ‘naturalistic’ reproduction of life but must 
describe reality as the party defines it; both characters and events must be idealized in 
order to educate and indoctrinate the public on the party line.”285  The Ministry of Culture 
and Art controls the usage of all culturally oriented propaganda.286  The regime’s 
propaganda machine relies heavily on its “manipulation and exploitation of history” to 
create “evidence” in order to promote themes that perpetuate the concept of juche, attest 
to North Korea’s role as the birthplace of traditional and authentic Korean culture, 
promote reverence for Kim Il-sung and his anti-Japanese heroics, create revolutionary 
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credibility for Kim Jong-il, and foster anti-Americanism.287  Other propaganda initiatives 
target the North Korean workers to expedite and induce the overproduction of goods.288  
These operations seek to “whip its people into a revolutionary frenzy...Carried on at 
breakneck speed and referred to in borrowed military terminology as ‘speed battles.’”289   
 Domestic North Korean counterpropaganda operations were necessitated by the 
once prevalent ROK PSYOP products disseminated in North Korea; however, these 
efforts have subsided in recent years due to various agreements between the two states.290  
Leaflet balloons were actively utilized by the ROK PSYOP forces as were novelty items 
such as radios.  In methods similar to those of the Korean War, propaganda balloons 
launched from South Korea that did make it across the DMZ were alleged by the KWP to 
be “poisoned.”291  Only those individuals who were considered the most loyal to the 
regime were chosen for the mission of retrieving the balloons, which was made difficult 
by the fact that they usually descended on urban areas.292   
a. The Rise of Anti-Americanism 
  Years of anti-U.S. indoctrination themes have bred a hostile view of the 
people of the United States in successive North Korean generations.  Anti-Americanism 
spans the whole of the North Korean education system, therefore, “Starting in 
kindergarten and continuing through adulthood, North Koreans are taught to despise the 
United States as an aggressor and an imperialist that ignited a fratricidal war between 
northern and southern Koreans by prompting the South to invade the North in 1950.”293  
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The DPRK has mastered the repetitive use of history to continue to stoke this anti-
American sentiment among the North Korean people.  Themes that attribute U.S. 
imperialist aggression against Korea to as far back as the 1866 sinking of a U.S. gunboat 
near Pyongyang are still persistently exploited as though it were recent news.294  The 
DPRK also continues to purport that the United States is the main hindrance preventing 
the unification of the Korean peninsula.  Thus, the North Korean populace perceives that 
U.S. dominance of the ROK regime is oppressing the populace of South Korea and 
preventing meaningful progress toward reunification.295  Such practices were initiated 
under Kim Il-sung and have not changed substantially in that:   
South Korea is treated invariably as the “military fascist puppet” of the 
United States.  Citizens of the DPRK are called upon “to fight to the end 
for the toppling of the fascist dictatorship” in the South.  The term “to 
liberate” is used concerning Pyongyang aims vis-à-vis the ROK.296
 North Korean propaganda directed toward South Korea may have 
provided some chillingly effective results because “anti-Americanism is growing at a 
startling rate in South Korea, potentially escalating into a serious problem that could 
jeopardize the future of the U.S.-Korean alliance.”297  With improved ROK democratic 
freedoms that were granted in 1987, the ability of North Korean philosophies to permeate 
South Korean society has increased.298  Due to the stringent anti-communist regulations 
that were fundamental to South Korea’s Cold War existence for decades, the increased 
liberalization removed significant barriers to North Korean sources of information and “it  
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cannot be denied that anti-American sentiment among the young generation [of South 
Koreans], which is undermining the US-ROK alliance, is closely related to North Korean 
propaganda.”299   
After decades without contact with such ideas, perhaps it should not have 
been surprising that substantial numbers in the South were not inoculated 
with the skepticism needed to counter the simple if often deceptive appeal 
of Northern propaganda.  The inherent attraction of the new and 
previously forbidden enhanced the attraction.300
North Korean themes divisively portray the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea as 
imperialists and condescendingly chide the ROK for continuing to endure “the ignominy 
of having foreign troops on its soil, ‘controlling’ its armed forces, buying its women, 
golfing on its prime real estate and disseminating crass American culture 
over…television.”301
b. Thematic Shifts and Recent Developments 
While the majority of propaganda operations conducted under the regime 
have maintained thematic continuity over the years, of late there have been some 
noticeable shifts to attempt to account for recent DPRK troubles.  Themes that involve 
the hardships of the famine and economic difficulties in the years after the death of Kim 
Il-sung are cropping up.302  This is a break from the traditional form of North Korean 
socialist realism that was prevalent under Kim Il-sung in that they are acknowledging, to 
a certain degree, the shortcomings of the state.303  The incorporation of these events 
portray Kim Jong-il as being too dramatically involved in national security and military 
issues to  be  able  to  oversee  agricultural  production.304  However,  modified  calls   for  
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personal sacrifices are still demanded from a starving population through the “strain of 
guilt injected in the message – that people don’t work hard enough to feed the ‘Dear 
Leader.’”305   
President Bush’s post-September 11 castigation of North Korea as 
constituting one arm of an “Axis of Evil” certainly served to provide new anti-U.S. 
materials to the KWP propagandists.306  Despite the resurgence of tensions primarily 
centered on North Korea’s reassertion of its overt nuclear ambitions,307 both North and 
South Korea continued to take measures toward de-propagandizing the DMZ.  In June 
2004, “The billboards and broadcast towers proclaiming South Korea’s ‘freedom, 
abundance, happiness’ or North Korea’s ‘politics by a generous king’” were slowly being 
dismantled.308  But at the end of July more than two hundred North Koreans defected to 
Seoul and the following day two hundred twenty seven more did the same.309  This was 
the largest mass defection from North Korea in its short history.310  Thus, by August the 
talks between the two Koreas had stalled and the removal of DMZ propaganda ceased 
about halfway through to completion.311  
There has also been much recent discussion involving the removal of Kim 
Jong-il’s pictures from prominent places, mostly those visited by foreign diplomats.312  
Some claim that this is one step in a gradual movement toward preparing another 
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dynastic successor to Kim; however, others feel that it is evidence that Kim is merely 
trying to “update his image.”313  North Korea has condemned these reports in stating that, 
“Recently the US let reptile media and riff-raff spread the sheer lie that portraits of leader 
Kim Jong-il are no longer displayed in the DPRK.”314  They further alleged that such 
claims were part of a U.S. psychological operations campaign that sought to instigate a 
regime change in North Korea.315  While such claims are hardly accurate, the DPRK 
propagandists take close note of U.S. PSYOP forces and their actions abroad.  This is 
evidenced in a Nodong Sinmun316 article that analyzed U.S. combat operations in Iraq and 
noted that:  
The United States is combining several kinds of special operations with its 
large-scale military strikes to occupy Iraq.  Their greatest effort among 
these special operations is in psychological warfare.317
Further North Korean protests voicing their paranoia of U.S. PSYOP activities 
precipitated a statement in December 2004 that presaged a DPRK withdrawal from the 
“six-party talks over dismantling its nuclear weapons programmes [sic], warning the US 
to stop its ‘undisguised psychological operation aimed at a regime change’ in 
Pyongyang.”318  The DPRK Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) also released a 
statement that articulated:  
The hatred of the army and people of the DPRK towards the US is rapidly 
mounting due to its escalation of the smear campaign to bring down the 
political system in the DPRK.  Under this situation the DPRK is 
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compelled to seriously reconsider its participation in the [Six-Party] talks 
with the US, a party extremely disgusting and hateful…319
Thus, in February 2005, North Korea unambiguously announced that it indeed possesses 
nuclear weapons and that it would no longer participate in the Six-Party Talks.320   
3. North Korean Media 
North Korea’s multi-faceted, state-managed media is the cornerstone of 
maintaining the KWP monopoly on information.  North Korea continues to employ 
newspapers, radio and television programs, and films to perpetuate the ideological 
saturation of the society.  Amazingly, many of the themes that they utilize have changed 
relatively little over the years.  A recent DPRK poster campaign called for the North 
Korean populace “to smash the US imperialists’ moves to stifle the DPRK and defend the 
nation’s right to existence [sic].”321  Such a generic declaration could easily have fit into 
the immediate post-Korean War era of propaganda operations.  But while the state’s 
domination of information access and flow continues, the global trends in increased 
porosity of state borders synonymous with the Information Age are challenges that 
require active countermeasures by the North Korean regime.  Speculation continues to 
abound that North Korea’s precarious economic condition and other factors could be 
eroding their abilities to maintain continued isolation from unwanted external influences.  
Therefore, “As North Korea enters the 30th month of its experiment with free-market 
reforms – including deregulating prices and increasing foreign trade – diplomats, 
analysts, intelligence sources and recent defectors say that the once airtight lid on 
information in what is known as the Hermit Kingdom is gradually loosening.”322
While the DPRK may have achieved success in controlling internet access, the 
infiltration of cellular phones is becoming more of a problem evidenced by the recent 
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estimate that “as many as 20,000 North Koreans – particularly those trading in the newly 
thriving border area with China – now have access to Chinese cellular phones.”323  Thus, 
as the prolonged state-led battle to monopolize information continues, emergent 
technologies will remain a potent threat to these efforts.  However, their domination of 
conventional forms of media continues relatively unabated. 
a. Newspapers 
  Several daily North Korean newspapers are published and serve as the 
written voice of numerous KWP interests within the country.  The published propaganda 
themes have remained so constant throughout the years that:  
When one reads a North Korean newspaper, one gets the impression that it 
is a very old newspaper except for dates and names.  Otherwise it contains 
essentially the same ideas, slogans, style, and logic.324   
There are four national newspapers and eleven provincial newspapers that are produced 
as well as a few others at the local level.325  The Rodong Sinmun (Workers’ Daily) is the 
official newspaper representing the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee.326  The 
Minju Choson is representative of the government; the Ch’ongnyon Chonni represents the 
“Youth Vanguard” of the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League (KISSYL); and the 
Choson Inmingun represents the Korean People’s Army.327  On an international level, the 
DPRK widely distributes the Pyongyang Times in both English and French and has 
continued to do so in excess of thirty years.328  Domestically acquiring these newspapers, 
however, is also a highly state-controlled process: 
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Newspapers are not sold through retail channels and are available 
exclusively through subscription.  Subscriptions are handled through 
district authorities, who decide who reads what.  Each family may 
subscribe to only a single periodical; everything else must be read in 
libraries.  Foreign media are available only to the Central Committee of 
the KWP, the Foreign Ministry, certain other government agencies, and 
the Academy of Social Sciences.329
Rodong Sinmun carried an editorial printed on New Year’s Day in 2001 
celebrating its 20,000th edition.  Emphasized within the article was the role of the media 
in furthering propaganda on behalf of the Kim regime stating, “The socialist press is the 
resolute defender and speaker for the leader’s ideas and cause.”330  It then explicitly 
developed the critical objectives that should be followed in promoting such propaganda: 
- Publicize the greatness of Kim Chong-il [sic] by emphasizing his 
achievements. 
- Promote the so-called Military-First Policy by treated [sic] the 
KPA [Korean People’s Army] as the nation’s last bulwark against 
foreign diplomatic, economic, and military pressures. 
- Increase “class awareness,” for example, guard against ideological 
contamination from capitalism, especially among North Korea’s 
post-Korean War generations. 
- Encourage workers to intensify their efforts to improve NK’s 
[North Korea’s] economic infrastructure. 
- Educate “all compatriots” on the NK [North Korean] formula for 
rational reunification. 
- Support the global anti-US movement.331   
Thus, it is apparent the unconcealed and prominent role that the media plays in 
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b. Radio and Television Broadcasts 
  While new forms of media have been developed over the years, the KWP 
utilizes all possible communication channels that it controls to influence domestic (and 
international) audiences.  Presently, vehicle-mounted loudspeakers conduct broadcasts on 
a daily basis in North Korea at major hubs of activity to bolster workers’ morale and 
continue the mobilizing emphasis on “Kimist” ideologies.332  This is important for 
stifling any cynicisms of the North Korean laborers while simultaneously promoting hard 
and efficacious work.   
  Radio broadcasts continuously operate under the auspices of the state 
while access to outside broadcasts is explicitly prohibited by the government:   
North Koreans in possession of private radios must report to authorities, 
who mechanically alter them to catch only local stations.  Those caught 
listening to outside radio broadcasts can be sent to prison, according to 
North Korean defectors.333
However, this does not stop all efforts to acquire and conceal radio receivers that are 
unaltered and thereby still capable of receiving international broadcasts: 
…many [defectors] were spurred on by foreign broadcasts they heard on 
new imported radios smuggled in from China.  Unlike those approved for 
sale in North Korea, the Chinese radios can pick up transmissions from 
abroad, abounding in tales of Seoul’s glittering skyscrapers and streets 
jammed with late-model cars.334
Therefore, in recognizing the susceptibilities of its people to such broadcasts, the DPRK 
has gone to great lengths to control the use of domestic radio receivers and to try to 
bargain with the South Korean government to stop harmful broadcasts into the DPRK.  In 
September 2003, the DPRK ceased broadcasting its own propagandist “Voice of National 
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Salvation” into South Korea in efforts to invite reciprocal cessation of ROK Korean 
Broadcasting System (KBS) broadcasts into North Korea.335  
North Korea also centrally controls television broadcasts.  Similar to the 
mechanical alteration of radio receivers, the North Koreans only sell archaic televisions 
that utilize a dial which is then soldered into place.336  Much of what is broadcast for 
television are movies and documentaries that promote the specified themes: 
The North Korean populace has been brainwashed into uncritical 
acceptance of the Kim legend by a propaganda machine that has utilized 
not only Workers Party indoctrination, a state-controlled educational 
system, and a monopoly of radio and television but also a highly 
developed motion picture industry.337
Movies that are broadcast via this medium are typically created by one of 
three “national film studios” that disseminate storyline plots that typically depict fictional 
revolutionary characters who are martyred for the overall good of the socialist state.338  
Each of these studios annually creates approximately thirty movies each, some of which 
are distributed abroad as products of Mokran Video.339  Most of the movies that are made 
are “documentaries” that utilize the same themes found in all other disseminations 
throughout the country.340  Documentaries and films about the two Kims constitute 
approximately 20 percent of all North Korean radio and television broadcasts.341
Within the last several years the DPRK has acquired satellite television 
broadcasting capabilities and has conducted increased internet propaganda distribution to 
affect international audiences.  In the past, the DPRK television broadcasts were 
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inaccessible to the people of South Korea due to the incompatibility of the broadcasting 
formats.  The DPRK broadcasts in PAL, except for Kaesong TV, and the ROK utilizes 
NTSC.342  The usage of a Thaicom 3 satellite on the part of the DPRK beginning in 1999, 
however, has negated this incompatibility and enabled foreign propaganda to reach much 
larger audiences.343   While the ROK’s National Security Law criminalizes consumption 
of communist materials, President Kim Dae-jung relaxed these laws to authorize news 
affiliates to screen and rebroadcast North Korean shows that penetrate into South 
Korea.344  Thus, while increasing its abilities to propagandize abroad, North Korea 
maintains its anachronistic monopoly on information in an age when increasing 
capabilities of global communications continue to be on the rise.  This remains as one of 
the regime’s main strengths and helps to explain its ability to prevent the development of 
realistic internal opposition to its existence to this day.   
D. IMPLICATIONS 
In the event of any scenario that reunifies the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea and the Republic of Korea there will be great difficulties.  The main point related 
in this chapter is that one of the largest challenges in the reunification process will be the 
social reintegration of the two significantly divergent groups of people and the difficulties 
of U.S. participation in such a process.  While the citizens of both countries were unified 
as one nation in the past, remembrance of times prior to partition are fading from memory 
as generations pass from one to the next.  Thus, the previously valid claim that Koreans 
are all one people is rapidly becoming an irrelevant argument to western observers.  
However, Koreans do not necessarily see it that way.  Since the signing of the armistice 
in 1953, the ROK has become increasingly westernized while the DPRK has increasingly 
sought to maintain its Hermit Kingdom status. The once culturally and linguistically 
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homogenous nation has thereby evolved following civil war and partition into two 
distinctly separate and divergent branches.  This is evident in the numerous practices of 
daily life and even how the people are taught (or allowed) to think.   
 Kim Il-sung, and to a lesser extent, Kim Jong-il, are both mythologized by the 
DPRK propagandists.  This has solidified their legitimacy in leading the dynastic 
communist regime.  Post-Korean War generations of North Koreans have been inculcated 
from birth with nothing but juche, anti-Americanism, and the undying DPRK emphasis 
on reunification.  As the generation of Korean War veterans fades from view it will 
become exponentially more difficult for the DPRK populace to have any realistic 
understanding whatsoever of their “Korean brothers” to the south.  Especially under the 
recognition that the DPRK domestic propaganda capabilities are so impressive that, “Call 
it brainwashing or education, or credit the art of a host of well-trained actors; no matter 
how the authorities had managed to pull it off, a visitor was left with the feeling he had 
traveled to the center of a great and still-burning faith.”345  Furthermore, anti-
Americanism is also on the rise in South Korea as at least a partial result of North 
Korea’s unrelenting external propaganda South Korean perceptions of U.S. policies. 
Undoubtedly the ramifications of more than a half-century of anti-Americanism 
are of concern for the future U.S. interests in the region, especially with its active pursuit 
of objectives in fighting a Global War on Terror.  Such aggressive U.S. activities are 
already unpopular across many nations of the world and denounced as imperialistic 
without the specific indoctrination of people to foster its development.  Meanwhile, 
“North Korean anti-American indoctrination and self-imposed isolation have produced 
generations of North Koreans who have an extremely simplistic and distorted view of 
American soldiers and the society they come from.”346  The widespread use of North 
Korea’s authoritarian information control across all aspects of its society poses a 
significant threat to the success of possible U.S. stabilization and reconstruction 
operations that could be necessitated by the renewal of combat operations on the 
 
345 Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader:  North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, 361. 
346 Strategic Studies Detachment, “Special PSYOP Assessment:  Potential North Korean Propaganda 
Exploitation of US and Coalition Captives.” 
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peninsula or through peaceful reunification.  As the United States continues to fight for 
winning the “hearts and minds” of the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is vital to begin 
training for the possibilities of future operations in Korea because countering more than a 
half-century of methodical communist indoctrination will involve much more than 
cursory preparation.   
81 
 
                                                
IV. CONTEMPORARY PSYOP:  A NEED FOR CHANGE 
Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to making 
democracy work.347
A. POST-COLD WAR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
1. Breaking the “PSYWAR Syndrome” 
Following the Vietnam War and the subsequent ten year regression into the 
“PSYWAR syndrome,” psychological operations finally began to be revived under the 
Reagan administration.348  Later, shortly after the creation of the United States Special 
Operations Command in 1987, both Army civil affairs and psychological operations 
forces were organized under the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 
Command (USACAPOC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.349  Thus, psychological 
operations began gaining more of a funding focus that coincided with the decline of the 
Cold War.  The U.S.-led Persian Gulf War in 1991 involved a large PSYOP effort that 
was also highly publicized by the media due to its largely overt nature.350    During the 
war, PSYOP efforts were “credited with netting a large proportion of the 87,000 EPWs 
[enemy prisoners of war] counted at the close of the conflict.”351  Thus, the end of the 
Persian Gulf War did not witness the same downward spiral into PSYOP irrelevancy that 
had been recurrent since World War II.  However, the U.S. military as a whole continued 
 
 347 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work:  Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1993), 185. 
 348 This is due in large part to President Reagan’s declaration of the informational element to national 
power in his national security strategy.  Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “No More Tactical Information 
Detachments:  US Military Psychological Operations in Transition,” in Psychological Operations 
Principles and Case Studies, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama:  
Air University Press, 1996), 29-30. 
 349 Ibid., 31.  USACAPOC was established in 1990.  The United States Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations Command is a subordinate unit to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
also located at Fort Bragg.  Psychological operations is one among the U.S. Army’s five special operations 
forces.  The other four are civil affairs, special forces, special operations aviation, and the rangers.   
 350 Although PSYOP did play a role in both Operations Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983) and Just Cause 
(Panama, 1989), their roles were not nearly of the magnitude of Operation Desert Storm.  Stanley Sandler, 
“Cease Resistance:  It’s Good For You!”:  A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort 
Bragg, NC:  U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 320-330.   
 351 Ibid., 331. 
82 
 
                                                
to be subjected to the practice of post-war reductions in manpower and funding.352  
Throughout the 1990s, the 4th Psychological Operations Group remained the Army’s only 
active duty PSYOP group despite the increased operational tempo that ensued.   
2. Post-Cold War Military Paradigm Shifts 
The onset of the post-Cold War period also saw the rise of intrastate conflicts over 
the once prevalent interstate wars that were characterized largely by conventional warfare 
tactics: 
With the decline in East-West tensions, neither the Soviet Union (later 
Russia) nor the United States was willing to maintain Cold War levels of 
military and economic assistance to their respective allies, particularly in 
parts of the world that were now perceived to be strategically 
inconsequential, such as sub-Saharan Africa.  This allowed international 
organizations, including the UN, to become more directly involved in 
efforts to bring an end to several long-standing conflicts.353
Therefore, as the United Nations became increasingly involved in peacekeeping 
operations so, too, did the United States.354  Between 1990 and 1995 the United States 
executed “forty-seven major operational deployments – a 50 percent increase over the 
Cold War years.”355  The latter years of the 1990s involved even more frequent and larger 
troop deployments to the Balkans in peacekeeping roles and a continued presence in the 
Persian Gulf.  Thus, with the end of the Cold War the United States has averaged new 
involvement every eighteen months in states requiring post-conflict reconstruction.356  
This increased emphasis placed on military personnel serving in non-combat roles 
 
 352 The number of active duty U.S. Army divisions dropped from eighteen to ten.  Tommy Franks, 
American Soldier (New York:  HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2004), 168. 
 353 Roland Paris, At War’s End:  Building Peace After Civil Conflict (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 16.   
 354 “In the decade from 1989 to 1999, the United Nations deployed thirty-three peace operations, more 
than double the fifteen missions that the organization conducted in the four preceding decades.”  Ibid., 17. 
 355 Franks, American Soldier, 170-171. 
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involved missions that the U.S. military was not historically trained to conduct.  
Psychological operations were no exception. 
a. Increased Civil-Military Interaction 
The rise of the postmodern period in military affairs that is characterized 
by the “interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres” has increased the interactions 
between deployed soldiers and a host of organizations with varying interests.357  These 
increased civil-military interactions are concomitant with the increasing usage of the 
military in functions that are not traditionally military (multinational peacekeeping or 
humanitarian assistance)358 or in post-conflict environments such as those currently 
evidenced by Iraq and Afghanistan.  Such surroundings are permeated by numerous non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)359 and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs).360  
These organizations provide a myriad of vital services to needy populaces.  The number 
of non-governmental organizations alone rapidly increased in the 1990s from 
approximately 6,000 to more than approximately 26,000 by the end of the decade and 





 357 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold 
War,” in The Postmodern Military:  Armed Forces after the Cold War, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen 
Williams, and David R. Segal (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2000), 2. 
 358 Charles C. Moskos, “Toward a Postmodern Military:  The United States as a Paradigm,” in The 
Postmodern Military:  Armed Forces after the Cold War, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, 
and David R. Segal (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2000), 17. 
 359 “NGOs are defined as private, self-governing, not-for-profit institutions dedicated to alleviating 
human suffering; or to promoting education, health, economic development, environmental protection, 
human rights, and conflict resolution; or to encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and 
civil society.”  Pamela Aall, “What do NGOs Bring to Peacemaking?”  In Turbulent Peace:  The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 
Aall (Washington DC:  United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 367. 
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Miltenberger, and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief 
Operations (Washington DC:  United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 3, 5. 
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PublicAffairs, 2004), 90. 
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b. Post 9/11 Paradigms of Nation-building 
Following the devastating terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the 
United States is much more mindful of the fact that “failed states matter.”362  Prior to this 
event, President George W. Bush had stated: 
I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders.  I 
believe the role of the military is to fight and win war…I believe we’re 
overextended in too many places.363
However, it has since become clear that, “In the age of global terrorism, transnational 
crime networks, and border-hopping disease, state weakness and failure are a real threat 
to Americans and their way of life.”364  Thus, the concept of stabilizing and 
reconstructing such states as a means to rehabilitate and strengthen security (both internal 
and external), have come to the forefront of U.S. national security interests as a means of 
proactive defense.  However, doing so requires not just improved security, but 
comprehensively addressing a host of other cross-cutting issues that foster stable 
governments and societies.  Such areas include participatory governance, socio-economic 
well-being, and justice and reconciliation.365   
3. Korean Reunification 
While it is clear that the United States military must be prepared for conflict 
because of the continued nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea (the other two 
members of the “Axis of Evil”), preparations must also be taken to support the potential 
destabilizing effects of a Korean reunification.366  Due to the protracted nature of the 
Korean War, which never successfully resulted in anything more than an armistice, 
 
362 John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Foreword,” in Winning the Peace:  An American Strategy 
for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC:  Center for Strategic and 
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reunification would constitute a post-conflict environment.  Partition has greatly divided 
not only the territory of Korea – but the culture as well.  The United States military 
should be prepared to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations in such an 
environment.  In the event that this scenario comes to pass, PSYOP forces should be fully 
capable of supporting such operations.  However, at this time they are not adequately 
prepared to conduct effective support to stabilization and reconstruction operations in 
general – and particularly in Korea.  This is despite more than fifty years of combined 
operations with Republic of Korea forces.  The painful lessons of psychological warfare 
efforts during the Korean War may well be evidenced again unless reforms are 
undertaken to improve PSYOP capabilities. 
4. Chapter Methodology 
This chapter will begin by explaining the new U.S. emphasis on stabilization and 
reconstruction operations and what they entail.  It will then explain the role of 
psychological operations in stabilization and reconstruction operations.  Next, it will 
describe the contemporary difficulties associated with psychological operations executing 
missions in a stabilization and reconstruction role in a reunified Korea.  It will then 
discuss the shortfalls that characterize PSYOP training and their impediments to effective 
support of stabilization and reconstruction operations.  Finally, this chapter will conclude 
with the prescription of ten PSYOP transformation recommendations to help meet the 
challenges of future U.S. operations.   
B. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS 
1. Increasing Emphasis on Stabilization and Reconstruction 
 Recent post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the National 
Security Strategy’s emphasis on the threats to U.S. security posed by terrorist havens and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation367 have led to the realization that the 
 
367 President George W. Bush stated in the National Security Strategy that, “The gravest danger our 
Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.  Our enemies have openly declared that 
they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with 
determination.”  The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 




                                                
United States must actively seek to stabilize states that are in danger of failure or 
collapse:   
As the world’s richest and most powerful country with a truly global 
presence, the United States is a prime target for those who would use weak 
states as a base of operations.  In a world of increasingly globalized threats 
from terrorist networks and from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
the United States has a disproportionate interest in ensuring a functional 
international system.368
In September 2004, the U.S. Department of State created the Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and named Ambassador Carlos 
Pascual to the post.369  The mission of this new office is “to lead, coordinate and 
institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict 
situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or 
civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market 
economy.”370  In early 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that: 
We have seen how states where chaos, corruption and cruelty reign can 
pose threats to their neighbors, to their regions, and to the entire world. 
And so we are working to strengthen international capacities to address 
conditions in failed, failing and post-conflict states.371  
 
368 Orr, “The United States as Nation Builder:  Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 
3. 
369 United States Department of State, “Establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS),” United States Department of State Press Release, 28 September 2004, available 
from URL:  http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36558.htm; internet; last accessed March 2005. 
370 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, “About 
S/CRS,” available from URL:  http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm; internet; last accessed March 2005. 
371 Secretary of State Rice asked for an allocation $24 million dollars in fiscal year 2006 funds for the 
new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.  Condoleezza Rice, “President’s FY 06 
International Affairs Budget Request:  Secretary Condoleezza Rice Prepared Remarks before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee,” 16 February 2005, available from URL:  
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Conducting such operations may also include close liaison with Department of Defense 
agencies, especially in a post-conflict scenario.372  The Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization has clearly stated that their goals in this regard are to: 
– Coordinate civilian stabilization and reconstruction participation in 
military planning and exercises.   
– Deploy Humanitarian, Stabilization and Reconstruction Team 
(HSRT) to Combatant Commands to participate in post-conflict 
planning where U.S. military forces will be heavily engaged. 
– Develop mechanisms for coordinating military and civilian 
operational planning across the full spectrum of possible military 
involvement in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) 
operations.373 
Thus, the importance of implementing comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction 
programs abroad to promote democracy and security while reducing terrorist safe-havens 
and WMD proliferation is at the heart of U.S. national security interests in the post-9/11 
era:  “With global terrorism a reality, the United States does not have the luxury of 
ignoring troubled countries no matter how small, how poor, or how distant.”374
2. The “Four Pillars of Post-Conflict Reconstruction” 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the 
United States Army have jointly formulated a “four-pillared” approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction.375  These are means to stabilize a state through the improvement of four 
vital areas:  security, social and economic well-being, governance and participation, and 
 
372 Opponents of such a view include Chalmers Johnson who has argued that the current presence of 
U.S. military forces deployed extensively around the globe serve as a “new form of empire.”  Furthermore, 
Johnson warns that, “Americans may still prefer to use euphemisms like ‘lone superpower,’ but since 9/11, 
our country has undergone a transformation from republic to empire that may well prove irreversible.”  
Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire:  Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York:  
Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 1, 4. 
373 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, 
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374 Orr, “Preface,” x. 
375 Initially a “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework” was published in 2002, however, it has 
since evolved into a more in-depth work entitled Winning the Peace:  An American Strategy for Post-
Conflict Reconstruction, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC:  Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Press, 2004), 305-327. 
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justice and reconciliation.376  Glaringly, current U.S. military doctrine does not articulate 
how to provide adequate support to bolster the cross-cutting imperatives involved in 
stabilizing and reconstructing a state.377  It is unlikely, however, that this will continue to 
be the case due to the current emphasis on post-conflict strategies, U.S. Army 
transformation, and the involvement of the Association of the United States Army 
(AUSA) involvement in the joint project to develop the “four pillars of post-conflict 
reconstruction.”378  Therefore, it is important that notice be taken of the factors that 
facilitate effective stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
a. Security 
Security is considered to be the “precondition” for fulfilling the other three 
pillars of post-conflict reconstruction.379  While security may be provided by external 
actors, “To be lasting, security must ultimately be provided by indigenous actors on 
behalf of the country itself….”380  The basic importance of security to a state was 
articulated in Max Weber’s assertion that “a state is a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.”381  Therefore, the state’s overall legitimacy is dependent, along with the 
deliverance of other “political goods,”382 on the establishment of this monopoly of the use 
of force within its borders.  This pillar of security includes both protections from external 
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11. 
377 Ibid., 15. 
378 General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan is a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff and the current 
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threats as well as from internal ones.  The adequate establishment of security fosters an 
environment where “citizens can conduct daily business relatively free from violence or 
coercion directed at them by the government, organized crime, political organizations, 
and ethnic groups.”383  This can be made quite difficult in post-conflict societies where 
armed factions have disintegrated and diffused back into society, but possess no civilian 
skills to earn a living.384  Thus, the importance of effective disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration (DDR) of former armed forces and armed factions is evident in their 
potential destabilizing affects on a state’s national security.385   
b. Social and Economic Well-Being 
The improvement of social and economic well-being is essential to post-
conflict operations.386  It is true that in the wake of violent conflict only “a small window 
of opportunity exists to restore economic hope and social well-being.”387  With greater 
security, improved economies reverse the myopic behaviors that are induced by 
warfare.388  This further reduces the numbers of individuals who are likely to seek 
employment from insurgent groups.  The short-term efforts are focused on returning 
basic human services and then shift into “long-term social and economic 
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development.”389  Essential human capital that was depleted due to the conflict must be 
replenished by returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes 
or by completely re-creating these capabilities.390  Health care must be rapidly expanded 
to combat the spread of diseases and to treat those already afflicted – especially those 
with HIV/AIDS and malaria which spread very rapidly in the wake of violent conflict.391  
Improved educational opportunities must be afforded to help reduce the risk of conflict 
and to provide long-term social, political, and religious tolerances:  “A state’s inability to 
support basic education also leaves room for religious schools that exclude women or 
indoctrinate young men to elevate violence as a political means.”392  Efforts must also be 
taken to diversify economies that are primary resource commodity dependent.393  Such 
dependence has been found to be the single greatest predictor of conflict.394  Reducing 
primary commodity dependence helps to minimize natural resource predation and rent-
seeking behaviors.395  Such predatory behaviors are integral in funding rebellions.396
c. Governance and Participation 
Improving governance includes creating “mechanisms, processes, and 
institutions”397 that are viewed as legitimate, ensure the enfranchisement of the populace, 
and deliver the necessary political goods.398  Participation is essential because it further 
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helps to legitimize the government and promotes governmental accountability to the 
citizenry.  Thus, the “cardinal rule of governance” is to ensure “indigenous ownership of 
the process.”399  Developing transparency in governmental processes, budget 
development, fiscal flows, and deliverance of goods is important to reducing corruption 
and its harmful effects.400  Guaranteeing free and unfettered media is also vital to 
allowing for the free flow of information as well as further promoting government 
accountability.401    
d. Justice and Reconciliation 
The establishment of the rule of law in post-conflict states while also 
addressing past grievances, crimes, and atrocities is vital toward moving societies further 
away from the clutches of the “conflict trap.”402  Judicial systems must be created that are 
independent (of the executive), impartial, and accountable.403  The state corrections 
institutions must be humane and law enforcement agencies must be effective and mindful 
of human rights.404  The concept of post-conflict reconciliation is that of “both a goal – 
something to achieve – and a process – a means to achieve that goal.”405  It is comprised 
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of four major components:  healing, truth-telling, restorative justice, and reparations.406  It 
is clear that reconciliation is a long-term process: 
The damage wrought by mass atrocities and lawlessness in post-conflict 
societies usually takes years, if not decades, to begin to repair.  But failure 
to address justice and reconciliation needs on a priority basis is a recipe 
for failure in reconstruction operations.407
Therefore, it is important to begin the establishment of reconciliatory mechanisms, such 
as truth-telling commissions, in the early stages of post-conflict operations; however, 
their effects may not be evident for generations.   
3. Increased Face-to-Face Interactions 
Inherent to the inevitably increased involvement of the United States in 
stabilization and reconstruction operations is the concept of military forces operating 
among the civilian populace of a given state in face-to-face roles.  Such missions will 
require increased language, cultural, and regional training to communicate not only with 
the indigenous populace, but with the host of IGOs, NGOs, and other transnational actors 
that more and more are operating in post-conflict environments.  These interactions, 
when conducted properly, can improve perceptions of U.S. involvement and may also 
improve critical U.S. human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities with regard to 
numerous issues including the most significant threats facing U.S. security interests 
today:  WMD proliferation and terrorist cells.  It is true that “IGOs, IOs [international 
organizations], and NGOs frequently possess valuable information but are reluctant to 
share intelligence with security forces for fear of reducing their rapport with the 
population that serve and increasing their own risk by appearing partial.”408  However, 
the increasing prevalence of these organizations makes contacts and cooperation 
somewhat inevitable.  Furthermore, increased positive military interactions with the 
indigenous populace and NGO, IGO, and IO members can help to build social capital to 
the great benefit of both the United States and the post-conflict state.   
 
406 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, eds., Reconciliation After Violent Conflict:  A Handbook, 24. 
407 Flournoy and Pan, “Dealing with Demons:  Enhancing Justice and Reconciliation,” 100-101. 
408 Feil, “Laying the Foundation:  Enhancing Security Capabilities,” 53. 
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4. Social Capital, Networks, and Trust 
The building of social capital is critical to strengthening the viability of a post-
conflict state and ultimately for “making democracy work.”409   Social capital is defined 
as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve 
the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”410  Wars destroy human 
capital and social capital as well: 
…civil war can have the effect of switching behavior from an equilibrium 
in which there is an expectation of honesty, to one in which there is an 
expectation of corruption.  Once a reputation for honesty has been lost, the 
incentive for honest behavior in the future is much weakened.411
As wars are waged and violence escalates, economies decline, large-scale migration of 
refugees and IDPs occur, and myopic outlooks on life take hold:  “Because life is so 
uncertain, people shorten their time horizons and are less concerned to build a reputation 
for honesty.”412  Therefore, to place in the perspective of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma,”413 
war-torn societies do not observe the “shadow of the future,”414 but merely focus on the 
present and the payoff for immediate defection.  Thus, the rebuilding of trust through 
 
409 Putnam, Making Democracy Work:  Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, 185. 
410 Ibid., 167. 
411 World Bank, Civil War and Development Policy (7 February 2003), 9. 
412 Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy, 20. 
413 The “Prisoner’s Dilemma” of game theory is “a binary choice game based on the following 
scenario:  Two partners in a crime have been apprehended.  The prosecutor separately offers a reduced 
punishment to each prisoner if he or she will discuss the involvement of the other.  If only one prisoner 
defects – that is, gives the prosecutor the information he is seeking – he or she stands to gain; if both 
prisoners defect, both stand to lose.  If neither defects, however – that is, if they cooperate with each other – 
both prisoners will avoid penalty.”  Elinor Ostrom and James Walker, eds., Trust and Reciprocity:  
Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research, Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, vol. 6 
(New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 2003), 391-392. 
414 “What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that the players might meet again.  
This possibility means that the choices made today not only determine the outcome of this move, but can 
also influence the later choices of the players.  The future can therefore cast a shadow back on the present 
and thereby affect the current strategic situation.  Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic 
Books, 1984), 12. 
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repeated interactions is essential to resuming the normalcy of life and catalyzing 
commerce in the post-war years:415     
Networks facilitate communication and extend trust.  When success 
spreads through a network, it stimulates more cooperation, providing 
models for others about what works.  Innovation increases as the latest 
information and trends create a large-scale learning system in which many 
potential users share knowledge.416
Networks can further the realization of the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction by 
addressing important issues at a grass-roots level.  While all four areas may be addressed, 
this may be the most significant in terms of beginning reconciliation processes between 
former warring parties:  “Establishing trustful and respectful relations between men and 
women, and between particularly targeted groups of men and women, is essential for 
fashioning a democratic society.”417   
 As the United States finds itself more and more entwined with attempts to 
stabilize and reconstruct failing, failed states, and post-conflict states, the military will 
continue to play a vital role in contributing across a wide range of areas such as security, 
training, humanitarian assistance, etc.  The increased face-to-face interactions provide 
opportunity to foster realization of the “shadow of the future” within the indigenous 
populaces.  Through such mechanisms as grass-roots level networks, the United States 
can help to more efficiently move a nation toward democracy and stability while 
reducing labor to insurgent groups.   
In the Age of the Network, horizontal connections explode, not vertical 
ones.  The winners in the 21st century – companies, countries, and people 
– will be those with the greatest social capital.418
Furthermore, these networks may provide critical HUMINT to U.S. forces engaged in 
rooting out terrorist cells and stamping out WMD proliferation. 
 
415 “Trust, reciprocity, and networks are all mutually reinforcing, whether on the rise or on the wane.”  
J. Lipnack and J. Stamps, The Age of the Network:  Organizing Principles for the 21st Century (New York:  
Oliver Wight Publications, Inc., 1994), 189. 
416 Ibid., 189. 
417 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, eds., Reconciliation After Violent Conflict:  A Handbook, 13. 
418 Ibid., 198. 
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5. The Role of PSYOP in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations 
As one of the few arms419 of the United States military that is mainly concerned 
with “soft power,”420 psychological operations forces have a vested interest in promoting 
favorable U.S. perceptions abroad – especially in post-conflict nations that continue to be 
plagued by insurgency such as Afghanistan and Iraq.  This is no less true in U.S. efforts 
to resuscitate failing states and stabilize entire geographic regions.   
a. Supporting the “Four Pillars of Post-Conflict Reconstruction” 
Psychological operations themes should bolster the strengthening of the 
“four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction.”  While many themes are in line with such 
concepts, it is imperative to target comprehensively these four critical areas and their 
associated sub-tasks.  Psychological operations forces exist to “influence the behavior of 
foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals to support U.S. national 
objectives.”421  Therefore, it is imperative that PSYOP forces transform to support their 
impending use in stabilization and reconstruction operations.   
b. Building Social Capital 
Central to the concepts of improving stability within failing states is the 
building of social capital.  Psychological operations forces are critical to building trust at 
local levels to improve perceptions of the United States and their military forces and to 
facilitate cooperation on the part of the indigenous populace.  For the U.S. military, 
PSYOP forces are the primary “soft power” assets that can be utilized to catalyze other 
operations.  Such operations necessitate interpersonal, face-to-face, two-way 
communications.  To do so, however, requires specific expertise in language, customs, 
culture, and the region – as well as utilization of networks to expand influence throughout 
communities. 
 
419 While there are other information operations components that are concerned with the same, the 
other most significant wielder of soft power are the civil affairs forces which can provide concrete benefits 
to local communities while increasing positive civil-military interactions. 
 420 Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.  
It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”  Nye, Soft Power:  The 
Means to Success in World Politics, x. 
421 Emphasis added.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.302:  Tactical 
Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, June 2004, 1-1. 
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c. Providing Critical HUMINT 
The vital importance of reliable human intelligence (HUMINT) has 
become apparent in the post-9/11 atmosphere.  The Department of Defense recently 
announced its new Strategic Support Branch of the Defense Intelligence Agency that “is 
providing enhanced human intelligence capabilities to better support combatant 
commanders in the war on terror.”422  Psychological operations, however, could provide a 
great deal of useful and reliable information to the U.S. Army and Department of Defense 
through their interactions with civil society and transnational actors operating within a 
state.  While not explicitly stated as one of the five PSYOP missions,423 proper training, 
preparation, and execution will yield important HUMINT contributions to the continued 
Global War on Terror and in stabilization and reconstruction operations.   
C. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
1. Lessons Learned, But Not Heeded   
Following the noted difficulties of psychological warfare in the Korean War and 
more than fifty years of U.S. involvement in observing the armistice, one would expect 
that modern psychological operations would be quite adept as a result.  However, this is 
not the case.  Modern PSYOP forces are ill-prepared to conduct operations in Korea – 
and especially in the event of reunification.  The Korean War era PSYWAR soldiers 
noted numerous shortcomings that they deemed essential to conducting effective 
operations in Korea.  The most glaringly among these were in reference to the little, if 
any, training received prior to deployment.424  In many cases, these deficiencies remain 
inadequately addressed to this day.   While the difficulties posed to effective U.S. 
psychological operations by the information-controlling regime of North Korea have 
 
422 “The new teams, made up of about 10 civilians and servicemembers, are being deployed to support 
combatant commands’ warfighting capabilities with improved human intelligence, officials said.  The 
teams may include case officers, linguists, interrogators and other specialists…”  Donna Miles, “Pentagon 
Explains New Human Intelligence Program,” Pentagon Brief, 1 February 2005, 2. 
423 These missions are “Advising the supported commander,” “Influencing foreign populations,” 
“Providing public information,” “Serving as the supported commander’s voice,” and “Countering adversary 
propaganda.”  Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-53:  Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, September 
2003, I-5. 
424 Including language, culture, and regional training.  See Chapter II. 
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been highlighted,425 it is important to address the difficulties of operations within South 
Korea as well.  A stabilization and reconstruction operation following a Korean 
reunification would involve U.S. communications with both societies as they attempt to 
merge, if the new state accepts that U.S. role. 
2. Mutual Unintelligibility 
Current U.S. psychological operations in the Republic of Korea involve 
deployments throughout the course of the year to participate in various exercises.  These 
exercises are short in duration and U.S. PSYOP forces redeploy to the United States upon 
their conclusion.  Although these exercises are “combined,”426 U.S. and ROK PSYOP 
forces within the Combined Psychological Operations Task Force (CPOTF) have 
difficulty in communicating with one another.  There are insufficient numbers of 
translators and few U.S. and ROK counterparts speak one another’s language effectively, 
if at all.427  Therefore, the entire task force relies upon a minority of personnel who can 
communicate in these two languages.  These are barriers that can be overcome with 
proper training.  The inabilities of U.S. forces to communicate effectively with their ROK 
counterparts in the designing of leaflets and preparation of radio/television broadcasts 
highlight the unprepared nature of PSYOP forces for contingencies requiring face-to-face 
operations under a stabilization and reconstruction role.  Furthermore, more than a half-
century of partition has exacerbated the initial bifurcation of the once homogenous 
Korean culture.  Thus, not only must PSYOP soldiers understand “ROK Korean” 
language and culture, but they must also be able to distinguish and operate utilizing 
“DPRK Korean” language and culture, as well as the regional dialects within each 
category.   
 
425 See Chapter III. 
426 U.S. and ROK Forces in Korea fall under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) headquartered in 
Seoul.  Operations and training events are conducted in a “combined” fashion that incorporates the 
interactions and planning of ROK and U.S. military counterparts to foster seamless mission execution. 
427 Although civilian analysts are hired by the Army for the PSYOP Group’s strategic studies 
detachment (SSD), there is only one Korea analyst.  “The SSD is made up entirely of Army civilian 
PSYOP analysts who provide area expertise, linguistic skills, and an organic social research capability to 
the regional POB [PSYOP Battalion].  Most analysts have an advanced degree and all read and speak at 
least one of the languages in their area of expertise.”  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 
3-05.30:  Psychological Operations, November 2003, 3-8. 
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3. South Korean Anti-Americanism 
Anti-Americanism in South Korea has been on the rise.428  Little is being done by 
U.S. PSYOP to combat this anti-Americanism.  There are no U.S. PSYOP forces 
stationed on the Korean peninsula to provide active PSYOP support to the Combined 
Forces Command (CFC).  However, South Korea still constitutes a psychological 
battlefield in that, “The fact that North Korea vehemently focuses on nurturing anti-
American sentiment in South Korea indicates that North Korea is still engaged in a civil 
war against South Korea and that it is now in the stage of attacking the alliances of its 
rival.”429  While there are many reasons for the rise of anti-U.S. sentiments in South 
Korea, some of the most prominent are the “U.S. military bases on Korean soil, the 
Korean media’s negative image of the United States, changing demographics, Korean 
nationalism, and skepticism [toward U.S. policies].”430  The demographics have shifted 
insofar as the Korean War generation of South Koreans, those that most strongly support 
close ties with the United States, is waning.431  It has further been speculated that, 
“Current trends suggest the great possibility that South Korea’s resentment toward the 
United States will become more aggravated in coming years.”432  Countering such trends 





428 “According to a recent public opinion poll, 63 percent of South Koreans have unfavorable feelings 
toward the United States, and 56 percent feel that anti-Americanism is growing stronger in the Republic of 
Korea.”*  Seung-Hwan Kim, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 1 (Winter 
2002-2003):  109.  The authors original footnote number 1 is denoted by the * and refers to “Public opinion 
polls were conducted by Media Research Inc. (Seoul) on February 23, 2002, immediately after the short-
track speed skating incident at the Winter Olympics in Utah.  See Chosun Ilbo, March 3, 2002; ‘Poll Shows 
Rising Anti-Americanism,’ Sisa Journal, March 7, 2002.” 
429 Jae-Chang Kim, “The New International Order and the US-ROK Alliance” The Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis XV, no. 2 (Fall 2003):  70. 
430 Kim, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” 111. 
431 “This generation is aging, however, and constitutes a diminishing percentage – 21 percent – of 
South Korea’s population.  Two-thirds of the country’s population is under the age of 40, and younger 
Koreans’ attitudes toward the United States are knotty.”  Ibid., 113. 
432 Ibid., 115. 
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D. TRAINING SHORTFALLS 
1. Perpetuation of a “Cold War Mentality” 
Despite the worldwide reduction in conventional interstate wars and rise of civil 
wars433 in the 1990s, U.S. PSYOP is still largely reminiscent of a “Cold War mentality” 
in how it trains for and executes operations.  A large degree of emphasis is habitually 
placed upon the technological aspects of PSYOP product production, distribution, and 
dissemination in order to keep pace with the rapid changes in mainstream media.  
However, regardless of the mode of dissemination, the most important aspect of 
conducting psychological operations is the message content.  Psychological warfare 
soldiers who were hastily deployed for the Korean War determined that inadequate 
training was one of the primary disadvantages to effective operations.434  While such 
shortcomings were known early on in the lifespan of psychological operations, the cyclic 
“PSYWAR syndrome” then hindered subsequent efforts to modernize and improve 
PSYOP forces.  When the importance of psychological operations was again 
acknowledged, and funding subsequently increased, great strides were taken to improve 
the technological aspects of both print and broadcast capabilities.435  These primarily 
focus on long-range dissemination methods via broadcast or leaflet.  While it may have 
been adequate in the Cold War era to conduct face-to-face operations via loudspeakers – 
this is really only one-way communication.  However, “Governments of countries 
threatened with insurgency should regard PSYOP, particularly face-to-face 
communications, as a first line of internal defense.”436  Thus, the PSYOP role in U.S.-led 
stabilization and reconstruction operations provides the impetus for training soldiers more 
effectively to foster interpersonal, face-to-face, two-way communications.     
 
 433 Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Warfare and the Third World (New York:  Palgrave, 
2001), 6. 
434 See Chapter II for more PSYWAR lessons learned in the Korean War. 
435 “Several Army initiatives in the early and mid-1980s upgraded active and reserve component print, 
radio, loudspeaker, and audiovisual capabilities.”  Paddock, “No More Tactical Information Detachments:  
US Military Psychological Operations in Transition,” 37. 
436 William F. Johnston, “Some Thoughts on Psychological Operations,” in Psychological Operations 
Principles and Case Studies, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama:  
Air University Press, 1996), 97. 
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However, as a result of the predominant focus on technological innovations and 
acquisitions, current psychological operations forces are not equipped with the requisite 
training for operating in post-conflict environments: 
…PSYOP has perhaps suffered most from identification with the 
hardware and missions of the tactical battlefield – that is, leaflet delivery, 
loudspeakers, and radio broadcasting.  As a result of all this, PSYOP has 
had very low priority in terms of… training, exercising, and doctrine.437
Thus, adequate training in culture, language, and region have continued to fall by the 
wayside under the opinion that familiarity is all that is needed for effective psychological 
operations.  A “cookie-cutter” approach has continued to dominate the field of 
psychological operations.  Leaflets or broadcasts that were deemed effective during prior 
conflicts are dusted off, translated, and disseminated to a new target audience.  Therefore, 
only limited linguistic, cultural, or regional training was necessary.  In the 1980s, the 
Army separated both its psychological operations and civil affairs forces from the foreign 
area officer (FAO) military occupational specialty.438   
The change was disturbing because it separated psychological operations 
from the specialty that had provided its intellectual lifeblood.  The core of 
the area expertise (knowledge of foreign cultures) and the analytic 
capability of psychological operations fell within the FAO specialty.439
The contemporary training that psychological operations forces undergo is disjointed and 
largely ineffectual for the future of U.S. operations.  Less overt methods of message 
dissemination than broadcasting a compact disc prerecording over a loudspeaker must be 
utilized.  The PSYOP soldiers should not be clearly identifiable as PSYOP soldiers.  
Their actions at the local level should be linked to persuasion principles440 that induce 
 
437 Carnes Lord, “The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,” in Psychological Operations 
Principles and Case Studies, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama:  
Air University Press, 1996), 84. 
438 Paddock, “No More Tactical Information Detachments:  US Military Psychological Operations in 
Transition,” 37. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Cialdini’s “Weapons of Influence:”  reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, 
authority, and scarcity.  Robert B. Cialdini, Influence:  The Psychology of Persuasion, rev. ed. (New York:  
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993). 
101 
 
                                                
indigenous individuals to act in desirable manners.  This requires proper training.  
Therefore, by building expertise in the appropriate areas of study and revising doctrine 
and techniques to support stabilization and reconstruction operations, psychological 
operations forces will then be able to build trust in communities, utilize and map 
networks to identify appropriate target audiences and themes, and help to improve human 
intelligence to the supported commander.  Such preparatory measures are essential to 
preparing for the challenges posed by Korean reunification.   
2. PSYOP Enlisted Soldier (37F) Training 
a. No Regional Training 
It is widely regarded that enlisted PSYOP specialists441 “conduct 
psychological operations.”  In other words, they craft the messages for specified target 
audiences.  Therefore, the training that is provided to these soldiers is paramount to 
ensuring effective and persuasive communications.  However, the training that is 
currently provided is inadequate for crafting messages for long-range dissemination 
(leaflet, radio/television broadcast), let alone for face-to-face operations in a post-conflict 
environment.   Immediately following basic training these soldiers attend a twelve week 
37F Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.442  This 
course provides training in “doctrine, including concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures 
organization, equipment, capabilities, and employment across the range of military 
operations,” as well as common soldier tasks.443  Thus, despite the doctrinal assertion that 
“PSYOP soldiers bring an in-depth knowledge of the culture, religion, values and 
mindset of TAs within a country or region of operations,”444 they receive no specific 
 
441 These soldiers belong to military occupational specialty (MOS) 37F (Psychological Operations 
Specialist). 
442 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Advanced Individual Training 
Psychological Operations (37F) Info Papers,” and “Advanced Individual Training Psychological 
Operations (37F) Specialist Scope,” available from URL:  http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm; 
internet; last accessed March 2005. 
443 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Graduation Criteria:  37F10 
MOS Psychological Operations Specialist (AC and RC) and CMF 37F10 Reclass” (6 January 2004), 2. 
444 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.30:  Psychological Operations, 1-8. 
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training in these areas whatsoever.445  This is a severe shortcoming in the training process 
because “culture is at once the most basic and the broadest environmental determinant of 
individual behavior.”446   
b. No Language Capability 
Following the 37F Advanced Individual Training Course, soldiers are sent 
to attend a Basic Military Language Course (BMLC) for a given language.  However, this 
training provides little more than language “familiarity.”  While the current BMLC 
language proficiency goals for its graduates increased in 2004,447 the standards are still 
below those necessitated by operations of a post-conflict nature.  Thus, under the old 
standards soldiers were to achieve a level in listening skills in which they comprehend 
“with reasonable accuracy only when this [listening] involves short memorized utterances 
or formulae.”448  Under the revised standards they are currently required to achieve a 
slightly higher level in which they can understand “very simple face-to-face 
conversations in a standard dialect.”449  Similarly, pre-2004 standards called for a level of 
reading capability in which the graduates are “unable to read connected prose.”450  
Current standards require one to be capable of reading “very simple connected written 
material.”451  Previous graduation evaluation criteria, and indeed Department of the Army 
language tracking, only focused on these aforementioned listening and reading skills.  
 
445 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Advanced Individual Training 
Psychological Operations (37F) Info Papers,” and “Advanced Individual Training Psychological 
Operations (37F) Specialist Scope,” available from URL:  http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm; 
internet; last accessed March 2005. 
446 Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., “Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP Paradigms,” in Psychological 
Operations Principles and Case Studies, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. 
(Montgomery, Alabama:  Air University Press, 1996), 55. 
447 Military language skills are measured on a scale from Level 0 (no proficiency) to Level 5 
(functionally native speaker) in listening, reading, speaking, and writing.  Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, Army Regulation 611-6:  Army Linguist Management (Washington DC:  February 1996), 35-42.  
The previous BMLC standards required soldiers to graduate at a level of 0+/0+ (reading and listening).  
Current standards require soldiers to graduate at a 1/1/1 level (reading, listening, and speaking).  “SF 
Officers, NCOs Must Meet New DLPT Minimum,” Special Warfare 17, no. 1 (September 2004):  63. 
448 Listening Level 0+.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 611-6:  Army 
Linguist Management, 37. 
449 Listening Level 1.  Ibid., 38. 
450 Reading Level 0+.  Ibid., 39. 
451 Reading Level 1.  Ibid. 
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However, these parameters have recently been expanded to include an emphasis on 
speaking skills as well.452  This is due to the widely acknowledged lack of U.S. language 
capabilities in the post-9/11 era453 and that, “We are also paying for America’s decades of 
neglect, in government and outside, of foreign languages and area studies.”454  Therefore, 
current graduates of BMLC are now required to reach a level in speaking capability in 
which the speaker is “unable to produce continuous discourse except with rehearsed 
material.”455  Meanwhile, tactical PSYOP units are doctrinally charged with conducting 
face-to-face communications, but this espousal does not underscore the fact that this is 
largely one-way communication via loudspeakers due to a lack of language expertise.456
c. No MOSQ Requirement 
While there are other enlisted soldiers who are more proficient in language 
capabilities assigned to PSYOP units, these soldiers are largely used for translating and 
are not trained in psychological operations.  These soldiers are identified as Human 
Intelligence Collectors457 and are organized under the Army’s military intelligence 
branch.  Language training for these soldiers is conducted at the Defense Language 
Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, where they are trained to higher standards than 
those required of the Basic Military Language Course.458  Soldiers assigned to the 
military occupational specialty 97E are considered “language-dependent” for mission 
 
452 “SF Officers, NCOs Must Meet New DLPT Minimum,” 63. 
453 A General Accounting Office report in 2002 analyzed “four agencies – the Army, the FBI, the State 
Department and the Commerce Department’s Foreign Commercial Division – with some of the largest 
foreign-language programs.  The GAO found that staff shortages at those agencies ‘have adversely affected 
agency operations and hindered U.S. military, law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism and 
diplomatic efforts.’”  Stephen Barr, “Looking for People Who can Talk the Talk – In other Languages,” 
The Washington Post, 12 March 2002, B2. 
454 David Ignatius, “Tongue-Tied in the Arab World,” The Washington Post, 11 July 2003, A21. 
455 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 611-6:  Army Linguist Management, 36. 
456 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.30:  Psychological Operations, 3-13, 3-
14. 
457 These soldiers belong to military occupational specialty (MOS) 97E (Human Intelligence 
Collector). 
458 Basic language courses taught at the Defense Language Institute are designed to train individuals to 
level defined as “limited working proficiency [Level 2].”  When applied to speaking skills, this level of 
proficiency enables one to “satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements.  Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, Army Regulation 611-6:  Army Linguist Management, 4, 36. 
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execution and must therefore retain the same Defense Language Institute minimum levels 
in language proficiency or be forced into an alternative military occupational specialty.459  
Psychological operations specialists (37F) are classified by current Army regulations as a 
“non-language-dependent MOS,” and therefore do not similarly have the same language 
requirement as part of their MOS qualification requirements.  Therefore, languages 
obtained at government expense are not required to be retained by the soldier.460  This is 
a drain on both budgets and resources.  Thus, the doctrinal assertion that PSYOP soldiers 
provide “provide regional, cultural, and linguistic expertise”461 is largely a misnomer.   
3. PSYOP Officer (39B) Training 
a. No Language Capability 
Psychological operations officers462 receive training at a four week 
Psychological Operations Officer Course (POOC), a seventeen week Regional Studies 
Course (RSC), and the Basic Military Language Course.463  Therefore, PSYOP officers, 
who do not share the enlisted soldiers’ focus on message crafting, receive formal regional 
training to increase their knowledge of a particular geographic area of the world.  This is 
the primary disconnect of the current training system.  They receive the same cursory 
language course as the enlisted PSYOP specialists and are likewise not required to 
maintain their language capabilities.464  
b. Irrelevant Postgraduate Degrees  
Some officers are further afforded the opportunity to attend Advanced 
Civil Schooling (ACS) to study at the postgraduate level.  These officers are often sent to 
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School under the auspices of the Special Operations Low-
 
459 This is referred to as a requirement for military occupational specialty qualification (MOSQ).  
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 611-6:  Army Linguist Management, 7. 
460 Ibid., 4, 36. 
461 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.30:  Psychological Operations, 3-7. 
462 These soldiers belong to military occupational specialty (MOS) 39B (Psychological Operations 
Officer) which in the future will be changed to 37A. 
463 The only difference between this training program and the one prescribed for Civil Affairs officers 
is the inclusion of the Civil Affairs Officer Course (CAOC) in lieu of the PSYOP Officer Course.  
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3:  Commissioned Officer 
Development and Career Management (Washington DC:  October 1998), 166-172.  
464 Ibid., 167. 
105 
 
                                                
Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) program (as are the civil affairs officers).465  However, out of 
the myriad of sub-component areas of expertise that comprise psychological operations, 
SO/LIC is but one setting for their usage.  Psychological operations utilize aspects from 
area studies, language, marketing and advertising, media operations, and persuasion and 
social influence.  Yet these relevant courses of study that underpin the principles of 
effective PSYOP are not pursued.  Postgraduate work should focus on areas that will 
further the study and improvement of PSYOP and not simply result in a master’s degree 
in unrelated fields of study. 
c. No Professional Discourse 
The PSYOP community does little to provide a professional outlet for 
information through academic discourse and institutional knowledge.466  While some 
PSYOP soldiers publish articles in the quarterly periodical Special Warfare, it is 
predominantly an outlet for special forces discourse and is frequently little more than a 
newsletter for the special forces, civil affairs, and PSYOP branches.467  The Disseminator 
was a publication of the 3rd Psychological Operations Battalion that was previously 
published and distributed throughout the PSYOP community; however, its printing fell 
by the wayside with the burgeoning needs of supporting both Operations Enduring 
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  However, it was not a publication for professional 
discourse commensurate with Special Warfare or other military journals.   
E. TEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PSYOP SUCCESS 
The following comprise ten recommendations for psychological operations 
success in supporting future global U.S. missions.  These recommendations target three 
major areas:  PSYOP training, PSYOP doctrine development, and PSYOP in the 
 
465 This program yields a Master of Science (MS) Degree in Defense Analysis with a specialization in 
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.  United States Naval Postgraduate School, “Department of 
Defense Analysis Special Operations Curriculum,” available from URL:  http://www.nps.navy.mil/da/; 
internet; last accessed March 2005. 
466 Samuel Huntington cites the publication of military journals as one of the contributors to the rise of 
professionalism within the United States military.  Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State:  The 
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 20th ed.  (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 243-244. 
467 Special Warfare is published quarterly by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.   
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Republic of Korea.  These recommendations support preparations for a reunification of 
the Korean peninsula as well as other operations of the post-Cold War era – such as 
stabilization and reconstruction operations – that require increased roles for face-to-face 
operations.    
1. PSYOP Training 
a. Language Training 
 Language training must be conducted to the DLI level of proficiency to 
provide greater capabilities to all PSYOP soldiers (officer and enlisted).  Previous 
standards of the Basic Military Language Course were too low to produce individuals 
with the requisite working knowledge to conduct face-to-face operations.468  The 
requirements were made more stringent toward the latter part of 2004;469 however, these 
standards are still below those necessary for operating in post-conflict environments and 
for soldiers who are widely assumed by the rest of the military to be experts in language 
and culture.470  These standards do not facilitate the provision of the critical expertise to 
supported units necessitated by interactions among an indigenous populace, especially in 
the face of an ongoing insurgency.  Standards should be increased to provide 
psychological operations soldiers at least a level of language capability commensurate 
with graduates of the Defense Language Institute.471  This will place them at a level of 
“limited working proficiency” that allows them to provide improved capabilities to the 
supported commander in difficult environments.   
b. Language Maintenance 
Maintenance of language capabilities to DLI standards must be made a 
requirement for MOSQ of all officer and enlisted soldiers.  Concomitant with the 
investment in increased language capabilities of PSYOP soldiers, standards need to be 
instituted to require that trained soldiers maintain their language capabilities.  Current 
 
468 Level 0+/0+ (listening and reading). 
469 Level 1/1/1 (listening, reading, and speaking). 
470 As espoused by current U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field 
Manual 3-05.30:  Psychological Operations, 3-7. 
471 Level 2/2/2 (listening, reading, and speaking). 
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PSYOP military occupational specialty requirements do not mandate language upkeep as 
a necessity for maintaining the PSYOP MOS (officer or enlisted).472  Therefore, to ensure 
the viability of the language needs of the Army and to maintain returns on the language 
training investment, PSYOP soldiers should be required to maintain the minimum 
standards of  2/2/2  to  be  considered  qualified  in  their  military  occupational  specialty 
(MOSQ).  This will also further ensure that commanders allot the appropriate time to 
their soldiers for mandatory language maintenance training thereby sustaining the 
language readiness of the force.   
c. Officer Recruitment 
Officers from across the Army possessing skills vital to PSYOP, especially 
in critical languages, should be actively recruited by PSYOP utilizing bonuses and other 
incentives.  In 2004, the Department of the Army Form 4037, otherwise known as the 
Officer Record Brief,473 began accounting for officer language proficiencies – including 
speaking skills.  Therefore, this tool should be rigorously utilized by the PSYOP branch 
to recruit officers possessing critical language capabilities, especially those languages 
that are considered more difficult such as Mandarin Chinese, Korean, Arabic, etc.474  
Those officers possessing such skills should be actively recruited by PSYOP utilizing 
bonuses or other incentives to reduce cost and training time but bolster the population of 
qualified personnel.   
d. Regional Studies for Enlisted PSYOP Specialists 
Psychological operations enlisted soldiers must receive regional and 
cultural training.  It is imperative that those soldiers who are the primary executors of 
psychological operations receive regional training.  The current training model inhibits 
regional expertise and cultural familiarity by excluding such training of the majority of 
 
472 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3:  Commissioned 
Officer Development and Career Management, 166-172.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army 
Regulation 611-6:  Army Linguist Management, 4, 36. 
473 The Officer Record Brief is a “snapshot” of a particular officer’s career, schools, awards, 
languages, etc. 
474 Languages are arranged into four categories with Category IV being those languages that are 




                                                
the soldiers involved in crafting psychological operations messages and conducting face-
to-face operations.  This facet of PSYOP remains a historically unaddressed issue dating 
back to the Korean War era.  The proper inclusion of regional training for PSYOP 
soldiers is crucial to ensuring the viability of PSYOP in forthcoming global missions. 
e. Officer Advanced Degrees 
Psychological operations officers should pursue master’s degrees in those 
disciplines that form the underpinnings of PSYOP such as regional studies, persuasion 
and social influence, and marketing.  The current ability of the U.S. PSYOP community 
to dispatch officers to various civilian institutions of learning to receive relevant degrees 
cannot be underestimated.  However, current officers have a tendency to attend the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) under the auspices of the Special Operations/Low-
Intensity Conflict program.475  Meanwhile, NPS offers degrees in specific regional 
studies that are frequented by U.S. Army officers studying to be foreign area officers – 
the “lifeblood”476 from which PSYOP was removed two decades ago.477  Regional 
studies degrees are far more relevant to psychological operations in general.  The Naval 
Postgraduate School has also recently developed a degree focused on stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, which is becoming more and more relevant to U.S. 
operations.478  Furthermore, degrees in marketing and persuasion and social influence 
should be pursued to help build PSYOP institutional knowledge.  While the new Army 
Intermediate Level Education (ILE) program has encouraged PSYOP attendance at NPS 
– it is important that the areas of academic pursuit are vital to PSYOP for the importance 
is not merely the completion of a postgraduate degree.   
 
475 United States Naval Postgraduate School, “Department of Defense Analysis Special Operations 
Curriculum,” available from URL:  http://www.nps.navy.mil/da/; internet; last accessed March 2005. 
476 Paddock, “No More Tactical Information Detachments:  US Military Psychological Operations in 
Transition,” 37. 
477 Such degree programs can be found at numerous other U.S. universities.  Some even provide 
programs that are more narrowly focused such as Korea Studies as opposed to Asia Studies.   
478 United States Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, 
“About the MA in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” available from URL:  http://www.csrs-




                                                
f. Professional PSYOP Journal:   “Military Influence” 
The 4th Psychological Operations Group should publish its own 
professional journal of military PSYOP, encourage discourse, and invite both the reserve 
component groups and other services to contribute.  It is essential during the current 
Global War on Terror and Army transformation processes to engage the professional 
minds of the PSYOP community.  Therefore, a professional PSYOP journal should be 
established and published in electronic format.  This journal should integrate knowledge 
from all PSYOP forces and encourage discourse among both active and reserve 
component soldiers and be circulated at all levels of the PSYOP community – include 
units from other services.   Such a journal would promote the furtherance of PSYOP 
studies and initiate new and improved practices in PSYOP training, doctrine, 
procurement, equipment, and mission execution. 
2. PSYOP Doctrine  
Just as current U.S. military doctrine does not adequately address operations in 
failing, failed, or post-conflict states, neither does PSYOP doctrine address the 
comprehensive support to such operations.   
a. Supporting Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations 
Corresponding to current trends in military operations, the principles that 
underpin stabilization and reconstruction operations, most notably the “four pillars of 
post-conflict reconstruction,” should be closely scrutinized for doctrinal advancements in 
PSYOP support.479  In the increasing U.S. focus on stabilization and reconstruction as a 
strategy in the Global War on Terror, it is important for PSYOP to devise methodical 
means to support those areas that constitute the “four pillars.”   
b. Establishing Psychological Operations Networks (PONs) 
Trained PSYOP personnel should be utilized to establish Psychological 
Operations Networks (PONs) as a means of persuading target audiences at a grass-roots 
level.  Such networks utilize the building of social capital via interpersonal interactions 
 
479 This should be done through interaction with the newly established Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.  Information on this center can be 




utilizing two-way face-to-face communications in the target language while allowing the 
mapping of the varied nodes in the network.  Messages that are delivered are adaptive 
and persuasive in pursuing PSYOP objectives.  This enables PSYOP to improve its 
persuasiveness in supporting U.S. objectives while gathering critical HUMINT, 
identifying insurgents or potential insurgents, facilitating the facets of stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, and ultimately winning more “hearts and minds” than 
previously possible.  
3. PSYOP in the Republic of Korea 
a. Deployment of Trained PSYOP Personnel to South Korea 
It is imperative that the training and deployment of a PSYOP detachment 
to the Korean peninsula be expedited.  While it is clear that the United States military, 
under its current strategies for restructuring its geo-strategic positioning, is withdrawing 
large amounts of troops from bases in South Korea, psychological operations forces 
should conversely deploy forces to the peninsula.  This unit should be fully trained in the 
Korean language and culture, with special care given to determining the divergent points 
along these lines with regard to the two distinctly separate nations.  Current PSYOP 
soldiers deploy multiple times a year from the United States to the Republic of Korea for 
exercises and then redeploy back to the United States.  Thus, personnel continually rotate 
and the focus is merely on the exercise at hand – not on improving combined 
psychological operations.  Furthermore, these multiple transitions are far from seamless 
and often detract from improving relations or capabilities.  These soldiers can provide a 
continuous presence on the Korean peninsula that avoids the difficulties that are always 
associated with short deployments to and redeployments from the region.  After more 
than fifty years of combined operations, PSYOP forces should have more substantial ties 
and capabilities within the Republic of Korea than those currently possessed.   
b. Active Combined Psychological Operations 
The conduct of active combined psychological operations, focused on both 
ROK and DPRK target audiences, must be instituted immediately.  Permanently deployed 
PSYOP soldiers should devote time to the study of current marketing and media 
operations within both South and North Korea.  These units should focus on 
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counterpropaganda operations with designs to dilute anti-American sentiment and 
promote the ROK-U.S. alliance.  Such operations will further hone the PSYOP capability 
in the Republic of Korea by ensuring language immersion for current Korea specialists, 
one of the most difficult languages,480 and also by maintaining up to date knowledge of 
regional and cultural trends.   
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CHAPTER V:  CONCLUSION 
American is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by 
failing ones.481  
-President George W. Bush 
Given the relatively short history of U.S. psychological operations forces as a 
continuous unit and the cyclic post-war neglect that has hindered developmental progress, 
today’s PSYOP forces may have finally broken with the “PSYWAR syndrome.”  In light 
of the fact that effective changes in the realm of individual training have not been 
adequately addressed since their recommendation in the wake of the Korean War, 
contemporary PSYOP forces have the precise moment in history to affect such reforms.  
Furthermore, the Army as a whole is cognizant of the need for rapid and effective 
transformation to support the Global War on Terrorism.  Doing so, however, requires 
abandoning the “Cold War mentality” that colored the latter part of the twentieth century 
in favor of transforming psychological operations training, doctrine, and tactics in a 
manner that is consistent with the postmodern trends of the military and Information Age 
principles.  However, this does not necessarily mean increasing emphasis on technology.  
While technological advancements have increased global communication capabilities and 
simultaneously reduced cost, the true emphasis for PSYOP transformation needs to shift 
toward providing more comprehensive training to its soldiers.  Technology serves merely 
as the means for dissemination, not as the origination of the message itself.  The modern 
PSYOP parallel to the Korean War era PSYWAR emphasis on “quantity over quality”482 
is the current emphasis on “technology over training.”  This issue is further underscored 
by the predominant tactical PSYOP role as loudspeaker operators instead of face-to-face 
communicators with verbal abilities.  The emphasis on disseminating previously recorded 
messages continues to perpetuate an ethos of limited “warrior deejays” instead of capable 
 
481 Robert C. Orr, “The United States as Nation Builder:  Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction,” in Winning the Peace:  An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. 
Robert C. Orr (Washington DC:  Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 3. 
482 See Chapter II. 
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“warrior diplomats.”  As the U.S. Army Special Operations Command has stated as its 
“Special Operations Force (SOF) Truths:”  “Humans are more important than hardware,” 
“Quality is better than quantity,” “Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced,” 
and “Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies 
occur.”483  Hence, PSYOP needs to analyze its current investments in human capital and 
determine how to maximize their efficacy.  Consequently, such increased investment in 
human capital also requires careful scrutiny of those areas of the world that are the most 
critical for developing linguistic, cultural, and regional capabilities.   
Psychological Operations transformation is necessitated by growing civil-military 
interactions in military missions and an increased need for effective, two-way, face-to-
face communications.  Furthermore, by entering into such social interfaces, PSYOP 
forces can better assist the supported commander through more effective persuasion, 
communication, and increased human intelligence (HUMINT) acquisition capabilities.  
Each personal interface between PSYOP personnel and a given individual in a post-
conflict setting serves as one node in an overarching “Psychological Operations 
Network” that can be mapped.  Such information can further highlight those local areas 
or individuals that are in need of PSYOP attention – as well as other needs such as those 
met by civil affairs forces.  Such work is advantageous to identifying further, and 
sometimes less obvious, key communicators in grass-roots settings to affect more 
widespread PSYOP influence.   
The rising importance of stabilization and reconstruction operations to transform 
failing, failed, or post-conflict states as a means of fostering regional stability and 
enhancing U.S. security also necessitates careful contemplation on the part of 
psychological operations planners.  Specific doctrinal support to the “four pillars of post-
conflict  reconstruction”  and  their  respective  sub-tasks should be developed to enhance  
 
483 Headquarters, United States Army Special Operations Command, “HQ USASOC Special 
Operations Forces Information:  Truths,” available from URL:  http://www.soc.mil/hqs/hqs_home.htm; 
internet; last accessed March 2005. 
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PSYOP capabilities and efficacy under such scenarios.  Such research should not merely 
be placed on hold until Army doctrine is revised due to the growing importance of such 
operations. 
The relevance of initiating substantive changes in the aforementioned critical 
areas is brought to light when viewed through the lens of Korean reunification.  The 
prospects of conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations on the Korean 
peninsula represent a multitude of difficulties for the potential use of U.S. forces.  This 
includes interactions with both the North Koreans and South Koreans.  While 
preparations must be pursued in readying PSYOP for support to stabilization and 
reconstruction operations in general, the case of a reunified Korean peninsula offers a 
unique challenge due to the severity of the protracted Cold War partition.  The 
communist regime of North Korea, led by Kim Jong-il, continues to play upon its 
citizens’ xenophobia by repetitively utilizing anti-Americanism in its domestic 
indoctrination programs as well as its externally distributed propaganda.  These themes, 
which have changed relatively little over the half-century since the Korean War, serve as 
a means through which DPRK nationalism can be stirred and the detrimental “military 
first” policy can continue.484  The deification of the dynastic rulers of North Korea 
through an active propaganda machine that effectively monopolizes information and 
defines truth is a particularly foreboding and anachronistic phenomenon in the 
Information Age.  Generations of North Koreans have now been raised completely from 
birth in the ubiquity of “Kimism.”  Furthermore, the prolonged partition of the Korean 
peninsula has fostered two separate and distinguishable cultures that also have linguistic 
difference.  Such peculiarities must be understood and effectively utilized by PSYOP 
forces if true persuasion is to be affected.    
While the people of South Korea have not been inculcated with anti-American 
ideology in ways commensurate with North Korea, external DPRK propaganda is at least 
partially accountable for anti-American sentiments that have been on the rise in South 
 
484 See Chapter III. 
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Korea for a number of years.485  Such opposition further heightens the difficulties that 
U.S. forces may face in occupying a role as a stabilizing force during a Korean 
reunification.  In light of such trends, however, current U.S. PSYOP forces are doing 
little to counter such anti-U.S. perceptions within South Korea.  Continued inaction in 
this respect only further reduces future PSYOP prospects for success under a stabilization 
and reconstruction role and threatens to undermine the ROK-U.S. alliance.   
It is imperative that PSYOP forces, properly trained in the Korean language and 
culture, be positioned in South Korea and conduct active, psychological operations to 
improve the perception of the ROK-U.S. alliance among the South Korean populace.  
Furthermore, these forces should focus on examining contemporary ROK and DPRK 
culture, media, and advertising to increasingly hone PSYOP persuasion techniques and to 
ensure that the specific differences between the two nations are observed.  In 
transforming to support future U.S. national interests, the PSYOP community should 
carefully research a number of vital areas to avoid “cookie-cutter” approaches and 
continue to seek improvements to the psychological operations profession.  Such fields 
include stabilization and reconstruction operations, transnational actors (especially IGOs 
and NGOs), language requirements for specific regions, and marketing, media, and social 
influence and persuasion tactics within given cultures.  These fields of study are fluid and 
therefore require continued attentiveness for determining subsequent shifts that are 
relevant to PSYOP programs.  Such areas will prove critical in the future as the United 
States becomes more proactive in preserving its national security through stabilizing 










485 See Chapter IV. 
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